



AMARI
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ISSUE 01 · SECTOR ANALYSIS · CORRIDOR SERIES

MELBOURNE · AUSTRALIA

The *Food* Economy

Agribusiness, food and supply chains across Sub-Saharan Africa.

AGRIBUSINESS · FOOD · SUPPLY CHAINS · 2026 · ISSUE 01 · SECTOR ANALYSIS

The Food Economy

Agribusiness, food and supply chains

VALUE IS CREATED, CAPTURED AND FINANCED BETWEEN THE FIELD AND THE BUYER

The Food Economy is the first issue in the AMARI Capital & Advisory Corridor Series. It examines the Australia to Africa opportunity one sector at a time, using the same standard of evidence throughout. It is written for investors and operators assessing a specific opportunity. It does not promote a market.

AMARI Capital & Advisory

Melbourne, Australia

July 2026

This is an analytical draft. Every figure is dated and sourced. Company examples are identified by their role and scale rather than by name.

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A single test guides this analysis: whether a business or technology changes the cost, risk, cash conversion, quality, compliance or market access of a specific operator in a specific value chain. The worksheet applies this test to a live counterparty during diligence.

ONE-PAGE DISTILLATION

The investable market is the hidden middle.

Durable returns in the food economy tend to sit with operators that control conversion, grading, logistics, records or repayment between the field and the buyer. The report tests whether a live counterparty controls the function that makes the chain financeable.

FIVE FINDINGS

~60% **The midstream carries the value.** Published estimates place 40 to 70 per cent of urban African food costs in post-farm-gate activities, depending on the product and country. The closest measured finance figure: agro-industry received 4 per cent of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa, 2010 to 2020.

31% **Asset control beats reach.** The strongest audited economics in the reviewed group belong to operators with physical conversion and distribution assets. Reach, downloads and funding rounds did not predict durability.

~83% **The capital gap is structural.** Agri-SME credit demand remains largely unmet. Any viable structure must price the counterparty tier and identify the guarantee, first-loss or blended catalyst.

EUDR **Compliance work is ready to begin.** Deforestation due-diligence obligations create a near-term preparation window for cocoa and coffee origins. Carbon economics are not yet independently bankable.

0 **The corridor is origination, not pipeline.** No comprehensive public measure of Australia-to-Africa agribusiness investment exists, and the documented relationship is concentrated in resources. Near-term value lies in finding a suitable local operator, testing its evidence and structuring a viable transaction.

THE ONE TEST

Does this counterparty control the scarce function and convert it into retained cash? Can it provide records a financier can underwrite?

Without that evidence, the opportunity may remain real but is not ready for capital. Page 46 provides a worksheet for recording the counterparty, evidence tier and next action.

BUILD NOW

EUDR origin compliance for West African cocoa exporters and cooperative unions.

Coffee geolocation and data-gap programmes for high-risk East African origins.

Capital-stack design for an aggregator, processor or warehouse-receipt operator that controls the records and repayment.

WATCH OR STRUCTURE

AAPCRA-linked advisory where a paying principal and local delivery path are named.

Francophone mid-cap diligence once stale or subsidiary-level accounts can be verified.

Article 6 and agri-carbon as an addition to compliance, with no standalone case over 24 months.

Immediate application: select one live deal, identify the counterparty and score the four gates. Stop if the evidence does not support operating control or collection.

Figures are directional unless identified as audited or disclosed. Company examples show archetypes and do not constitute recommendations.

FOREWORD

A note before we begin

We have come to think that the most consequential parts of a system are often the least visible. Food is one of those systems. We see the farm, and we see the market. Between them sits a long chain of storage, grading, processing, transport, finance and trust. It is ordinary work, but the evidence in this issue kept bringing us back to it.

A harvest can be plentiful and still fail commercially. It can spoil before it is stored, miss the grade a buyer requires, arrive too late, or be sold before the producer has recovered the cost of growing it. A field produces food; a system turns that food into reliable supply. The distinction sounds simple, but it changes where we look for value and where we look for risk.

We are naturally drawn to beginnings: the seed, the new technology, the promise of a larger harvest. We are also drawn to the end of the chain, where the product reaches a consumer and the price becomes visible. The middle receives less attention precisely because much of its work is unremarkable. Warehouses, cold rooms, mills, receipts, standards, trucks and repayment records do not make grand stories. They simply determine whether the story survives contact with the market.

The Australia to Africa corridor deserves the same restraint. We do not want to call a relationship a market merely because the logic is attractive. The documented commercial flow remains thin. What exists is a set of capabilities, relationships and problems that may be worth testing carefully. If a corridor is to become more than an idea, it will be built transaction by transaction, by counterparties prepared to put records, capital and reputation behind the work.

That is the spirit in which we read this issue. It is less a declaration of where opportunity sits than an attempt to see the system more clearly. The middle is not glamorous, but perhaps that is why it deserves attention. Things that endure are often built there: between production and payment, between promise and proof, between what can be grown and what a buyer can finally trust.

The pages that follow are an attempt to pay attention to that space, and to be disciplined enough to distinguish what is interesting from what is ready.

Jeremy Nyerenyere

Group Chief Executive Officer

AMARI CAPITAL & ADVISORY · MELBOURNE, JULY 2026

Most of the value, and most of the risk, sit in a layer that receives less attention than either the farm or the platform: the middle.

THE ANALYSIS APPLIES THE SAME EVIDENCE CONVENTIONS THROUGHOUT

Every page uses the conventions below. Readers should assess each figure against them.

The caveat travels with the claim Every figure is dated and sourced on the page that carries it. Where the evidence is thin, the language is deliberately tentative: appears, tends to, is reported to.	Ranges avoid false precision We use a range when the sources cannot support a point estimate. Directional figures are identified, and structural estimates remain separate from audited operator numbers.
Operators are treated as archetypes Businesses are identified by what they control and at what scale, without their names. This keeps the analysis focused on how the system works rather than reputation.	The diaspora provides access and trust The diaspora appears only as a source of access and trust that can make a counterparty more legible and reduce the cost of a first transaction. It is never used to measure the sector.
Mechanism determines whether a claim matters A tool deserves attention only if it changes cost, risk, cash conversion, quality, compliance or access at a named stage. If none changes, the tool provides visibility without changing the economics.	Examples show patterns without recommending them The cases show a pattern and do not endorse a company or transaction. They are intended to sharpen a decision while leaving it open.

THE CORRIDOR SERIES

01 The Food Economy Agribusiness, food and supply chains. THIS ISSUE	02 The Movement of Money Payments, remittance and capital flow. FORTHCOMING	03 The Skill Premium Talent, training and the labour market. PLANNED	04 Concrete & Capital Infrastructure and the capital behind it. PLANNED	05 The Always-On Layer Connectivity and the digital economy. PLANNED
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AMARI Capital & Advisory

The Food Economy, Issue 01

AMARI Capital & Advisory prepared this point-in-time analysis from the available published evidence. It is not investment advice. The corridor judgements are expected to change, and all figures require verification when used.

IN BRIEF

The midstream holds most of the value and receives little agricultural development finance.

Sub-Saharan Africa's food market depends on the midstream that turns a harvest into supply. Traders, processors, storage, logistics, finance and compliance connect the field to the buyer, while farms and technology platforms receive more attention. Published estimates place 40 to 70 per cent of urban African food costs in post-farm-gate activities, depending on the product and country; about 60 per cent is a midpoint shorthand. The closest measured finance figure is smaller: agro-industry received 4 per cent of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa, 2010 to 2020. The result is a gap between where value is created and where capital is allocated.

~\$313bn → \$1tn

The World Bank (2013) projected that Sub-Saharan Africa's agriculture and agribusiness market could rise from about US\$313bn in 2010 to roughly US\$1 trillion by 2030. A directional order of magnitude, not a current market size (World Bank, Growing Africa, 2013; Sub-Saharan Africa; directional).

40–70%


Published estimates place this share of urban African food costs in post-farm-gate activities, depending on the product and country (AGRA, Africa Agriculture Status Report 2017; Reardon et al.; directional).

~\$74_{bn}

ISF Advisors / CASA (2022) estimates the Sub-Saharan **agri-SME financing gap** at roughly US\$74bn a year against estimated demand of about US\$90 billion, about 84 per cent unmet. The estimate is directional.

Exhibit 1

The midstream carries most of the value and receives little agricultural development finance.



The shares are illustrative and directional. Sources used: AGRA, Africa Agriculture Status Report (2017), and Reardon et al. for the 40 to 70 per cent post-farm-gate range. African Union Commission and OECD, Africa's Development Dynamics (2023), for the 4 per cent West African agro-industry share.

The evidence suggests this mismatch is persistent. The investable opportunity is rarely a standalone application or general claim about farm productivity. It is more often a midstream business with recurring revenue, asset control, buyer relationships, contracted volumes or receivables. These characteristics identify activity the existing capital stack has not reached. Without them, scale and funds raised do not show viable economics.

The commercial question is who controls conversion, grade and repayment.

THE LENS

The operator must retain the gain for a business to pass the test.

The analysis tests each business or technology against a single question. Does it change the economics of a specific operator in a specific value chain on one of six dimensions, and can the operator retain the gain?

Cost Does it lower the landed cost of producing, moving or converting the product? IN ONE CHAIN A hillside irrigation scheme was estimated to raise plot profitability by 43 to 62 per cent after relieving the water constraint on output.	Risk Does it make a counterparty or a cash flow easier to price and underwrite? IN ONE CHAIN A warehouse-receipt operator reportedly placed more than US\$50m of receipt-backed commercial paper. The case is an illustrative example of how verified inventory can become financeable collateral.	Cash conversion Does it shorten the time between spending money and being paid? IN ONE CHAIN A buyer-deduction repayment rail collects payment at harvest and shortens the gap between input outlay and payment. Audited repayment was near 96 per cent.
Quality Does it raise grade, reduce loss, or make output more consistent? IN ONE CHAIN Grading and cold storage reduce post-harvest losses, which are frequently estimated at 30 to 50 per cent for fruit and vegetables in perishable chains. Estimates vary sharply by crop and location. FAO; CGIAR.	Compliance Does it open a market that a rule would otherwise close? IN ONE CHAIN Plot-level traceability keeps a cocoa exporter inside the EU market under EUDR, which applies from 30 December 2026 (large and medium operators) and 30 June 2027 (micro and small), subject to legislative change. European Commission.	Market access Does it connect supply to a buyer that was previously out of reach? IN ONE CHAIN A verified provenance record opened a roughly 33 per cent export premium on coffee. The evidence indicates that little of the premium reached the farm gate.

Two conditions must hold together. The intervention must relieve the **binding constraint** at a particular stage. A tool can be decisive in one chain and irrelevant in another. The operator must also be able to **capture the value it releases** rather than pass it to a buyer or competitor.

The test guards against the **pass-through trap**. A tool may relieve a real constraint without improving the intended beneficiary’s economics. The value can accrue instead to the next actor that controls the grade, certificate or buyer relationship. The sixth example shows this pattern: a working traceability premium that largely stopped at export.

Headlines also tend to merge **reach and revenue**. Registrations, downloads, funds raised and user counts are

inputs. Audited margin, loss rates, utilisation, buyer retention and collected receivables provide evidence of economics. The analysis requires the latter for a specific operator before treating a constraint as relieved.

The analysis therefore focuses on the operator within a particular chain. An intervention that is decisive for a perishable-vegetable trader may have little relevance for a storable-grain aggregator. The test is applied to each stage and chain, rather than to a technology in the abstract.

Applied at this level, the test produces a more uneven view than headline investment in Sub-Saharan African agritech suggests. It directs attention to the constraint removed, the operator affected and the party that retains the gain.

AT A GLANCE

The commercial case rests on five findings.

The corresponding part dates and sources each figure. Each claim retains its material limit.

~60%
VS 4% FINANCE SHARE

The midstream holds most of the chain’s post-farm-gate value and cost, and receives little agricultural development finance. Published estimates place 40 to 70 per cent of urban African food costs in post-farm-gate activities, depending on the product and country; about 60 per cent is a midpoint shorthand. The closest measured finance figure is narrower than the headline suggests: agro-industrial activity received 4 per cent of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa between 2010 and 2020 (African Union Commission and OECD, 2023). One ISF/CASA estimate places the agri-SME financing gap at roughly US\$74bn a year, representing about 84 per cent of unmet demand.

Part One. AGRA, Africa Agriculture Status Report (2017); AUC and OECD (2023); ISF Advisors / CASA (2022); directional.

30.9%
AUDITED PROCESSOR MARGIN, ONE COMPANY, ONE YEAR

The sample’s highest audited operating margin belongs to an integrated processor with physical asset control. The processor owns conversion and distribution. The best-funded asset-light logistics platforms raised more than US\$250 million collectively before suspensions or valuation collapse by 2025.

Part Three. Single listed processor: audited FY2024 operating margin; reported funding and restructuring records. One company, one year; not representative of the sector.

~83%
OF AGRI-SME DEMAND UNMET

Mispriced risk contributes to the financing gap. Demand for agri-SME credit in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at roughly US\$90 billion a year. Published estimates suggest that roughly four-fifths is unmet (SAFIN/industry, 2024; directional). For the smallest tickets, facility benchmarks place net lender margins at +1.6 and -2.2 per cent against a 16.2 per cent risk-free alternative without support. A stack combining first-loss capital and a guarantee can change that pricing. For each catalytic dollar, one benchmarked facility mobilised about ten times as much private capital, above common blended-finance norms (one facility, East Africa; results should not be generalised).

Part Four. SAFIN/industry (2024) for ~US\$90bn/~83%; ISF / CASA (2022) for ~US\$74bn/~84%; Aceli / Dalberg facility benchmarking (35 lenders, ~22,000 loans, East Africa), 2024; OECD Aceli blended-finance case study.

Thin
DOCUMENTED CORRIDOR FLOW

The corridor needs active work to find counterparties before it can support a pipeline. Documented Australia to Africa agribusiness transactions are limited. The most visible documented corridor commitment is ACIAR’s A\$76.4 million Africa-Australia agricultural research and capacity programme (2024-2030), which funds research rather than procurement. The evidence indicates each plausible entry point depends on a local integration partner. Near-term value therefore lies in originating and structuring access.

Part Five. ACIAR (AAPCRA); programme announcement, 2024; corridor diligence, 2026. Public-record finding; does not preclude private or undisclosed transactions.

2026
EUDR ENFORCEMENT

EUDR preparation creates a near-term compliance advisory opportunity. EUDR deforestation due-diligence obligations for European buyers apply from 30 December 2026 (large and medium operators) and 30 June 2027 (micro and small operators), subject to further legislative change. In one anchor Cote d’Ivoire cocoa origin, coverage reached about 58 per cent of cooperatives against a 100 per cent requirement in mid-2025. Compliance costs were benchmarked near EUR 10 to 60 per tonne. This creates a near-term advisory opportunity distinct from the longer-dated agri-carbon watch.

Part Five. European Commission EUDR; sector diligence, 2024–2026. Subject to further legislative change.

IN THIS ANALYSIS

Structure	Value capture	Operators	Financing	Corridor
The chain as a system.	Where margin sits.	Durable economics.	Priced against risk.	Origination, EUDR, carbon.

READING THE EVIDENCE

The evidence redirects five common assumptions about African agribusiness.

Five widely repeated propositions contain valid observations, but the evidence supports a different emphasis.

THE COMMON ASSUMPTION	WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
<i>Farm-gate productivity is the primary driver of agricultural value and returns across the continent.</i>	More value is added in the midstream than at the farm gate. Published estimates place roughly sixty per cent of value added between farm and fork in processing, storage and trading. Farm-gate prices reflect the costs and margins taken through the midstream. Without control of conversion or a buyer relationship, yield gains tend to benefit the aggregator before the farm.
<i>User uptake and capital raised by an agritech platform signal commercial durability.</i>	Unit economics and asset control provide stronger evidence of commercial durability. Several well-funded asset-light platforms reached significant user counts before valuation corrections or operational suspensions. The highest audited margins in the sample belong to integrated processors that own the conversion step. Registered users and funds raised measure reach and financing. Audited margin and buyer retention provide evidence of commercial durability.
<i>Direct smallholder credit is the primary frontier opportunity in African agricultural finance.</i>	The aggregator is often the more bankable counterparty. Without a collection mechanism, lending to dispersed smallholders tends to produce returns below the cost of capital unless blended-finance support is available. Better-performing facilities typically underwrite receivables at the aggregator or processor level. The smallholder benefits one step downstream.
<i>The size of the African diaspora in Australia is a reliable indicator of the potential commercial market.</i>	The diaspora is a bridge to access and trust, not a market-size indicator. Diaspora spending power does not show commercial demand for the supply-chain advisory or compliance services considered here. The more useful role is to build trust, reduce barriers to an initial transaction and introduce counterparties that are not readily found through a directory search.
<i>Agri-carbon and voluntary carbon markets represent the near-term commercial prize for the corridor.</i>	EUDR compliance supports near-term work. Carbon remains a 36-month watch item. Farmer-level income in current voluntary markets is reported at roughly EUR 7–17 per farmer per year in Sub-Saharan Africa (watch-list evidence). That level does not support a standalone mandate without buyer premiums that have not been documented at scale. EUDR obligations from December 2026 create a fixed compliance deadline. Agricultural carbon-market routes also exist, but their project economics, approvals and timing vary by methodology and jurisdiction.

Source note: The corresponding section provides full citations for each proposition. Each figure retains its source date and evidential limit.

OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT

Near-term access depends on evidence and proximity to a paying counterparty.

Accessible value differs across the near to medium term. The categories reflect the strength of evidence and proximity to a paying counterparty. None represents a confirmed mandate.

BUILD NOW

EUDR origin-compliance advisory, West African cocoa

The work includes programme design, data-readiness support and vendor selection for cocoa exporters and cooperative unions. EUDR creates a compliance obligation for operators supplying the EU market.

STATUS

Documented obligation

12–24 months

Coffee geolocation and data-gap programme, East Africa

Exporters with incomplete cooperative data may need geolocation workflow quality assurance and buyer-readiness advice. EUDR risk classification increases the cost of being unprepared.

STATUS

Documented obligation

12–24 months

STRUCTURE NOW

AAPCRA-linked agribusiness origination

The opportunity would connect research workstreams and Australian capability in water, dryland agronomy and advisory services to local delivery partners. The A\$76.4m commitment funds research rather than procurement.

STATUS

Documented programme

Near to medium term

Irrigation-technology advisory and origination, Egypt

A possible Australian irrigation-technology signal requires a confirmed budget-holder and local integration partner before it becomes a structured opportunity.

STATUS

Budget-holder unconfirmed

MOU-dependent

Francophone West African industrial mid-cap diligence

The work would cover diligence and capital-stack design for under-covered agro-industrial businesses with stale or subsidiary-level financials. The paying counterparty remains unnamed.

STATUS

Paying counterparty unconfirmed

Near to medium term

WATCH

Dryland and livestock systems advisory

Commercial work depends on identifying a principal with a budget behind the AAPCRA demand signals.

STATUS

Paying principal unconfirmed

Medium term

Warehouse-receipt and commodity-finance origination

Origination depends on a local sponsor, exchange sponsor or anchor processor that can support the financing structure.

STATUS

Sponsor unconfirmed

Medium term

HOLD OFF

Article 6 and agri-carbon readiness advisory

The work may be relevant as an addition to EUDR mandates. Standalone economics do not appear bankable within 24 months on current farmer-income and methodology evidence.

STATUS

Standalone case unsupported

36+ months

WHAT EACH STATUS MEANS

Build now applies where a regulatory or market deadline exists and the counterparty type is identifiable. **Structure now** applies where demand is evident but origination remains necessary. **Watch** applies where demand is directional and no paying principal has been identified. **Hold off** applies where standalone work is not yet bankable.

01

PART ONE

The Structure of the Food Economy

The useful unit is the chain that turns a harvest into supply a buyer can rely on. The evidence suggests that value and risk concentrate in the middle.

VALUE CONCENTRATES IN THE HIDDEN MIDDLE

Most value added between farm and fork arises in aggregation, storage, processing, grading, finance and compliance. These functions receive under five per cent of formal agricultural finance.

BOTH ENGINES MATTER

A physical engine moves and transforms product. An information engine makes a counterparty financeable. Control of one without the other tends to produce weaker performance.

DILIGENCE FOCUSES ON CONTROL

The useful question is who controls conversion, grade and the repayment rail, rather than how much is produced.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY

Value and risk concentrate in the operating middle.

An African food system depends on the chain of functions that converts a harvest into reliable, market-ready supply. The evidence suggests that **most value and risk sit in the middle.**

Discussion of African agriculture tends to focus on the farm, particularly yield gaps and access to inputs. For operators and investors, the useful unit is the chain behind the farm gate. Aggregation, storage, processing, grading, logistics, finance and compliance turn a dispersed harvest into a graded, financeable and deliverable product. The farm is seldom the only point of success or failure. Much of the outcome is determined in the middle.

This focus changes the question. The relevant test is whether a function changes cost, risk, cash conversion, quality, compliance or market access for a specific actor and value chain. Whether a tool is modern or digital is secondary. A yield increase is commercially material only if the extra output has a buyer, clears the required grade, is not lost to spoilage and converts into cash before input debt falls due. The middle determines whether output becomes margin.

A food economy has three zones: production, the middle and the market. Production supplies raw volume and is heavily studied. The market sets price and demand. The middle performs the conversion, yet tends to receive the least visibility and finance.

Institutional literature published over roughly sixteen years consistently reports that value concentrates in the midstream while finance remains scarce. Processing, aggregation, wholesale, storage and logistics are widely estimated to account for forty to seventy per cent of food costs in Sub-Saharan African urban markets. A dispersed population of small and medium enterprises handles much of this work. The closest measured finance figure is narrower: agro-industrial activity received 4 per cent of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa between 2010 and 2020 (African Union Commission and OECD, 2023; directional).

The mismatch also appears at sector level. Agriculture reaches up to thirty per cent of GDP in many African economies but attracts an estimated three to eight per cent of bank lending. This measure is distinct from the development-finance share above. It is a widely cited institutional stylised fact across IFC, IFAD and CGIAR literature covering multiple Sub-Saharan African countries, and should be read directionally. For operators and capital allocators, it indicates that enterprises central to the chain remain largely outside mainstream credit.

40–70%

Estimated share of urban food cost arising **after the farm gate**, in the midstream.

<5%

Share of agricultural development finance the **midstream receives**.

~\$74_{bn}

Estimated agri-SME financing gap, Sub-Saharan Africa; ~84% of estimated demand unmet (demand range US\$55–80bn) (ISF Advisors/CASA 2022; indicative).

AMARI'S VIEW

AMARI focuses its investment analysis on the operating middle.

Reported finance to the midstream remains small relative to its share of value.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY


Urban demand is concentrating growth in the handling-intensive middle.

Demand reinforces the structural case for the midstream. Urbanisation concentrates consumers, while rising incomes change what they eat. The resulting pressure falls on the layer that receives the least finance.

EXHIBIT 1 · THE DEMAND CHAIN

Urbanisation and income growth produce a dietary shift that concentrates new demand on the midstream.

How to read: follow demand from left to right. The centre column shows Bennett's Law, the established tendency for diets to shift away from starchy staples as incomes rise. Figures are institutional estimates unless noted.



Source note: Africapolis; AGRA AASR 2017–2024; Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa; urban population, dietary shares, food sales, imports and demand growth; measured, estimated or modelled as stated. Bennett's Law: M. K. Bennett, 1941; Norton, Alwang & Masters, 2010. City-survey and projection figures are directional.

Africa is urbanising faster than any other major region. Rising urban incomes increase food demand and change its composition.

Rising incomes shift food spending from starchy staples to processed food, animal protein and horticulture. Processed

foods are an estimated thirty-five to fifty per cent of urban purchases, and high-value perishables a further twenty-five to forty per cent (AASR 2020). Both require midstream cold storage, sorting, packaging and logistics.

567_M

Africa urban population in 2015 on Africapolis estimates; roughly 90M above the UN administrative count (AASR 2020).

+190%

Projected demand growth for fruit and vegetables, 2010–2050 (AASR 2017).

6% CAGR

World Bank 2013 projected path to about US\$1tn by 2030 for the Sub-Saharan African food and agribusiness market; directional.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY

Food-system transformation follows private and state-led routes.

Private enterprises address individual constraints incrementally. State programmes can mandate investment across the system. The routes differ in logic, pace and capital requirements.

EXHIBIT 2 · TWO ROUTES TO TRANSFORMATION

Both routes operate at once, although much of the continent's capital appears poorly matched to either.

Note on naming: these routes describe food-system change at macro level. The physical and information engines on the following pages describe how the midstream works at operator level. They are separate models.

ROUTE 1

Private incremental enablement

Aggregators, warehouse-receipt operators, cold-chain providers and embedded-credit firms address one binding constraint at a time. The system improves incrementally when individual enterprises establish viable economics.

A commodity-exchange operator used grading infrastructure and electronic warehouse receipts to support Nigeria's first commodity-backed commercial paper on an exchange, which reached NGN 26.9 billion as at the first quarter of 2022 and NGN 51 billion across its first two series by 2023. The receipts represented controlled commodity collateral within a broader issuance structure, not records alone. (AMARI operator-economics research, 2026; dated.)

Embedded-credit operators in outgrower programmes report repayment of 96–99 per cent as operating results rather than audited financial measures. Each season of clean repayment can support credit in the following season.

PACE: SLOW AND FRAGMENTED · CAPITAL: DEAL-BY-DEAL · SIGNAL: DURABLE WHERE ECONOMICS HOLD

ROUTE 2

State-orchestrated structural transformation

A government sets quantified targets, aligns public spending across ministries and mandates investment intended to attract private capital beyond the reach of an individual enterprise.

Morocco Green Plan (from 2008): reported investment exceeded US\$10 billion. Agricultural GDP was estimated to have risen by approximately 75 per cent, exports by around 117 per cent, and employment by approximately 342,000 jobs. The follow-on Green Generation programme committed a further US\$14 billion. (AASR 2025, institutional report citing programme data.)

Ethiopia Agricultural Transformation Agency: programme data report that approximately 286,000 smallholder farmers rose above the poverty line. The same data estimate US\$1.7 billion in value created and report deployment of national soil-mapping and extension systems. (AASR 2025, programme data.)

PACE: FASTER WHEN SUSTAINED · CAPITAL: MANDATE-ALIGNED · SIGNAL: OUTCOMES CONCENTRATED IN THE POLICY WINDOW

Source note: Data as at 2025 for Morocco/Ethiopia programme figures | sovereign programme geography | programme-reported outcomes | AASR 2025.

Private enablement examples: AMARI operator-economics research, 2026; enterprises described by archetype and scale, not named; repayment figures audited or disclosed by development-finance counterparties. Route 2 examples are named sovereign programmes in the public record. Nigeria ATA e-wallet and import-bill figures: Juma, *The New Harvest*, 2015 (secondary source); association reported, causality not established.

The two routes operate simultaneously in most major agricultural economies. Private aggregators and commodity-exchange operators address individual constraints, while government programmes set transformation targets at scale. Morocco and Ethiopia show Route 2 programmes sustained long enough to report system-level outcomes. Nigeria ATA (from 2011) illustrates the ambition. A national agricultural e-wallet registered over fourteen million farmers in three years. Nigeria's food import bill reportedly fell from about

US\$7.1 billion to US\$4.3 billion over the same period (Juma, *The New Harvest*, 2015; secondary source; association reported, causality not established; no controlled analysis isolating the e-wallet's contribution was found). The largest outcomes tend to occur when the routes reinforce each other. A state mandate creates demand for aggregation or compliance infrastructure, and Route 1 enterprises provide it.

AMARI'S VIEW

This publication applies Route 1 discipline, including operator-level financeability assessment and deal-level evidence, to determine where Route 2 mandates may create genuine capital entry points. **State-led ambition requires support from operator-level economics.**

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY

The operating middle converts a harvest into reliable supply.

A harvest is an input. The functions between harvest and buyer determine whether it becomes supply a buyer can rely on.

EXHIBIT 3

The operating middle converts harvested volume into reliable supply.

How to read: follow one harvest from left to right. Each function in the middle can add or lose value. The evidence suggests that both loss and value concentrate here.



Source note: 2013–2022 | Sub-Saharan Africa (midstream cost share, post-harvest loss); Africa-wide (market trajectory, import bill) | share (%); market size (US\$bn) | directional institutional estimates; not universal averages | AGRA AASR 2019/2020; NM-AIST 2022; World Bank 2013 | schematic; midstream share: estimated/directional; post-harvest loss: meta-analysis (measured); market trajectory: modelled (2013 projection).

Schematic; shares are directional rather than universal. Midstream cost share (~40–70% of urban food cost): AGRA AASR 2019, *The Hidden Middle*; Reardon/Minten; read directionally, not as a universal average. Post-harvest loss in fruit and vegetables (30–50%): NM-AIST peer-reviewed review (PMC:12490541, 2022); rates vary by crop and location. Food market trajectory: World Bank 2013 agribusiness projection (worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/03/04); directional baseline, not a current audited market size. Domestic supply share (>80%): AGRA AASR 2020, *Feeding Africa's Cities*. Post-harvest figures are a descriptive baseline for fruit and vegetables, not an intervention claim.

The middle converts raw volume into saleable supply. It determines whether a harvest reaches a paying buyer at an acceptable cost, grade and delivery time. Product is also lost in this band. Peer-reviewed work on fruit and vegetables puts post-harvest losses across the region at thirty to fifty per cent. Rates vary sharply by crop, country and storage type. Roughly sixty per cent of those losses occur in rural areas before produce reaches an urban market (NM-AIST, 2022).

The commercial focus is therefore the middle. A physical engine moves and transforms product. An information engine makes the resulting position legible to a lender. This

band creates most of the value added between farm and fork and carries most of the risk.

The market supplied by this band is large and growing. A widely cited World Bank projection placed Sub-Saharan Africa's food and agribusiness market on a path from roughly US\$313bn towards US\$1tn by 2030, used here directionally. Domestic producers already supply over 80% of urban food (AASR 2020), while food imports averaged about US\$38 billion a year in 2014 to 2016 on World Bank figures. Domestic supply must pass through the middle to reach consumers. Stronger domestic midstream capacity could displace part of the import bill over time.

~\$313bn → \$1tn

Directional trajectory of the **African food and agribusiness market** to 2030 (World Bank 2013 projection); not a current audited market size.

Reliable supply depends on the functions between harvest and buyer.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY


Physical control creates margin, while records determine financeability.

The reviewed operators show a consistent relationship. Asset control establishes the margin base. Stronger records increase the share that a lender can underwrite.

EXHIBIT 4

Bankability rises when the same operator controls assets and the records required to underwrite them.

How to read: archetypes are positioned by assessed physical-asset control and records strength. The diagonal is not a statistical fit. It shows the investability frontier suggested by the reviewed operator evidence.



Few reviewed archetypes occupy the upper right. This position requires control of the physical asset and records a lender, buyer or insurer can verify: grade, receipt, delivery, receivable and repayment.

Assets alone do not secure finance. They can hold margin, but remain difficult to finance without clean records. In the lower left, reach and fundraising can be mistaken for economics.

Source note: AMARI operator-economics review (2026); NGX/JSE/group audited accounts; exchange and issuer filings; DFI disclosures; press and company filings for cautionary archetypes. The chart combines the preceding evidence on control and record quality.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOOD ECONOMY

The asset earns the margin, while the record makes it bankable.

The two engines produce the strongest result when held together. Control of a physical asset tends to show up in realised margin. The information record makes that margin bankable. The evidence suggests that value leaks when either engine is missing.

EXHIBIT 5

Control of the physical asset can raise margin. A Rwanda hillside irrigation evaluation recorded farm profit gains of 43 to 62 per cent over rain-fed comparators.

How to read: the baseline is a comparable rain-fed plot in the same evaluation. The lower bar adds controlled hillside irrigation across three government-evaluated schemes in Rwanda. The evaluation covers one country and three schemes and uses a quasi-experimental design. The recorded gain operated largely through changed crop choice, from bananas towards dry-season horticulture. At publication, the cited source described it as the only rigorously evaluated irrigation impact study in Sub-Saharan Africa.



Source note: World Bank DIME quasi-experimental impact evaluation of three government hillside irrigation schemes in Rwanda (World Bank DIME Policy Brief, 2020; thedocs.worldbank.org). Data as at 2020 | Rwanda (three hillside schemes) | farm-level seasonal profit | comparison against rain-fed plots in same evaluation | measured. This is a single-country, three-scheme result reported as a profit gain rather than a yield gain. The World Bank reports that rigorous evidence on irrigation returns for smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa is very limited. The Rwanda evaluation is therefore an exception and does not establish a continental pattern.

A financier can see and hold the physical engine. Control of irrigation, processing, storage or a cold chain tends to turn effort into realised, defensible margin. Advice or a booking layer does not offer the same control. The irrigation evaluation provides a relatively clean example because it isolates the asset. It compares the same farmers and crop after a controlled change in the physical system, and reports a large profit change.


chain, a provenance or grade record can raise the export price without passing much of the gain to the producer. Part Two examines where that value is captured. The operators that appear most financeable hold both engines, a proposition tested against the evidence in Part Three. Development-finance backing signals credibility but not outcomes. Reach and funds raised do not show retained, paying usage. Evidence from one country or segment does not show a continental pattern.

Records make the asset legible to finance. Without them, the asset is hard to finance. Without control of the physical

EXHIBIT 5A · THE MIRROR CASE

Information can raise export value without passing the gain back to the producer.

How to read: the upper bar shows the price premium earned by a provenance and grade record at export. The lower bar shows how little reached the farm gate. The record raises value at the point of control, with limited transmission below it.



Source note: peer-reviewed natural experiment around a national commodity exchange (MDPI Agriculture, 2023). The study found that traceability supported export-level value and market access without, by itself, transmitting that value to producers. This is a single-context result, not a controlled trial.

A financeable position appears to require both the asset that earns margin and the record that supports financing.

02

PART TWO

Value Capture Along the Chain

Value is captured unevenly along food chains. The evidence suggests that conversion, grade and access retain more of it than production, where most physical risk sits.

WHERE VALUE ACCUMULATES

Margin tends to move toward conversion, grade and market access. In export crops, the consuming market can capture much of the downstream value.

THE PRODUCTION CONSTRAINT

Production carries weather, price and yield risk that is difficult to price. This contributes to the shortage of formal finance at the field stage.

THE TEST FOR TECHNOLOGY

A tool earns a return only if it relieves the binding constraint at a stage and the operator captures the value released.

VALUE CAPTURE ALONG THE CHAIN

Margin appears to concentrate in grade, conversion and buyer access.

Food-chain value is captured unevenly. The evidence suggests that stages controlling **conversion, grade and access** retain more value than the field, where weather, price and yield risk are concentrated.

One estimate assigns less than a twentieth of chain profit to the producer and close to four-fifths to the export stage. Most export-stage profit was recorded before the bean reached the consuming market.

Agricultural opportunities are easy to misread when risk and margin are assumed to sit with the same actor. The evidence suggests otherwise. Margin tends to accrue where a perishable harvest becomes gradeable, storable, financeable and eligible for a market. It accrues again where the paying buyer relationship is held. The field absorbs weather, pests, input-price swings and yield uncertainty, yet is often the lowest-paid stage in the chain.

AGRA estimates that the midstream of small and medium enterprises, covering aggregation, storage, processing, grading and logistics, accounts for roughly 60 per cent of combined value and costs in Sub-Saharan African food value chains (continental, partly informal and directional. AGRA AASR Hidden Middle, 2019; Sub-Saharan Africa). The preceding section documents midstream throughput and its share of agricultural development finance. Together, those

figures indicate that capital does not reach the midstream in proportion to its role in the chain.

Technology should therefore be assessed at the stage where it is used. A tool earns a return only if it relieves that stage's binding constraint and the deploying operator retains some of the value released. The rest of this section applies that test.

The evidence suggests margin is weighted toward stages closer to the consuming market, although the pattern is not uniform. Offshore capture can add to the value already retained at export. In export crops, actors the producer never meets may capture a large part of downstream value. The illustration that follows draws on documented export-crop observations and tests how far the record supports this reading.

~60%

of combined value and costs in Sub-Saharan African food value chains sits in the **midstream** of small and medium enterprises (AGRA, continental, directional).

40–70%

of urban African food costs arise **after the farm gate** on published estimates, depending on the product and country (AGRA, directional).

4%

of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa went to agro-industrial activity from 2010 to 2020, the closest published measure (AUC and OECD, 2023).

Source note: Data as at 2019–2024 | Geography: Sub-Saharan Africa (continental aggregate) | Unit: value/cost share (%); volume (tonnes); finance share (%) | Denominator: formal and informal agri-SME midstream | **Sources used:** AGRA Africa Agriculture Status Reports 2019–2024 (The Hidden Middle) | Status: measured (estimated from survey and national-accounts data; partly informal, treat as directional)

AMARI'S VIEW

The evidence suggests margin concentrates at conversion, grade and export access. Production absorbs most of the risk and retains the smallest share of the gain.

VALUE CAPTURE ALONG THE CHAIN

Annual producer prices and export unit values can diverge without showing how margin is divided.

This constructed FAOSTAT comparison sets the annual producer price against the same country's export unit value. In the available 2024 observations, Kenya's green-coffee export unit value is modestly above its reported producer price. Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa-bean export unit value is materially higher. Neither comparison measures profit or the later value captured through roasting, manufacturing, branding or retail.

EXHIBIT 6

The observed producer-to-export spread varies by commodity and does not show a fixed three-stage split.

How to read: each pair compares FAOSTAT's producer price with a constructed export unit value for the same commodity, country and year. Export unit value is reported export value divided by reported export quantity. Dark bars show export unit values, while grey bars show producer prices. Green text identifies the editorial takeaway.

Green coffee

Kenya · 2024

The two national annual values appear close. The export series is estimated from trade-partner reporting.

+6.6%

Producer price



US\$4,887
per tonne

Export unit value



US\$5,207
per tonne

Cocoa beans

Côte d'Ivoire · 2024

In the same year, the export unit value appears 1.48 times the reported producer price.

+48.1%

Producer price



US\$2,545
per tonne

Export unit value



US\$3,768
per tonne

Reading caution. These are national annual averages, not matched lots. Quality mix, timing, freight treatment and reporting coverage can affect the comparison. Kenya's 2024 export quantity and value carry FAOSTAT flag X, indicating an estimate using trade-partner reporting. Côte d'Ivoire's 2024 observations carry official flag A. The spread is not a measured margin and should not be allocated to named stages.

Data as at 2024 | Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire | current US\$ per tonne | source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT Producer Prices (updated 9 January 2026) and Trade: Crops and livestock products (updated 23 December 2025), accessed 16 July 2026 | constructed reading. FAOSTAT material used under CC BY 4.0.

The comparison covers national annual values. It uses two national, same-source observations in place of a single-region profit split. The data support a narrow conclusion: the spread between producer and export values appears to vary sharply by commodity and market structure.

The measure excludes offshore value. Further value may accrue through roasting, processing, consumer branding and retail after export. These figures show that export unit value can exceed annual producer price, but do not identify who receives the spread.

The record suggests that value capture varies with the chain, the grade and the buyer relationship.

VALUE CAPTURE ALONG THE CHAIN

Each chain has a different binding constraint.

The preceding FAOSTAT comparison applies only to the commodities and markets observed. Kenya coffee and Côte d'Ivoire cocoa show different producer-to-export spreads in the same year. The stage controlling the surplus appears to vary by chain type: mills in staples, cold-chain control in perishables, integration in protein, and export grade plus compliance in cash crops.

Diligence must identify the stage controlling conversion, timing and buyer access in the specific chain before applying any observed commodity spread elsewhere.

EXHIBIT 7

The stage holding margin varies across chain types.

How to read: each row identifies a control point that tends to hold margin. Producer-value references are directional and vary by country, quality mix, cooperative structure and market linkage.

Staples and grains Maize, wheat, rice, sorghum	Milling, refining and warehouse receipts may carry the spread. Conversion into consumer-ready flour, meal or refined sugar combines volume, brand, working-capital velocity and stored-commodity collateral. In one listed processor, audited margins in the reviewed evidence reach above 30% where refinery capacity is limited.	Mill and warehouse receipt The producer usually receives the commodity price. Conversion and grade add value later.
Perishables Horticulture, dairy, fish	Cold-chain control and last-mile proximity tend to hold margin because temperature, timing and buyer access determine how much product reaches the buyer in saleable condition. Loss estimates in fruit and vegetables frequently sit in the 30–50% range, with sharp variation by crop and geography.	Cold chain and last mile Formal processing access may improve the producer share. It remains thin without that access.
Protein and poultry Broilers, eggs, pork, aquaculture	Vertical integration across feed, grow-out, slaughter and distribution can concentrate margin. Listed integrated operators report margins in stable years. Disease, power and feed-cost shocks can move the same system quickly into loss.	Integrated system The contract producer carries biological risk, while the integration owner captures the system spread.
Export cash crops Coffee, cocoa, rubber, palm oil	Export processing, grade and buyer access can concentrate value before consuming-market processing adds margin offshore. Under EUDR, plot-level traceability and deforestation-free certification become requirements for market access. Optional reporting is no longer sufficient.	Export gate and compliance grade The producer share is often smallest before export and offshore processing.

Data as at 2017–2024 | Sub-Saharan Africa; Kenya coffee and Côte d'Ivoire cocoa | control points and current US\$ per tonne | sources: FAO, FAOSTAT Producer Prices and Trade: Crops and livestock products, accessed 16 July 2026; AGRA AASR 2017–2024; NM-AIST 2022; JSE/NGX FY2024 reports; World Bank; IFAD/CGIAR | constructed and directional; not sector averages.

READING CAUTION

Each row identifies a recurring control point, not a measured margin for any single chain. Producer-value references are directional and vary by country, quality mix, cooperative structure and market linkage.

VALUE CAPTURE ALONG THE CHAIN

Producers carry risks they cannot easily price.


The field absorbs uncertainty and faces constraints that are difficult to relieve, which may shift value elsewhere in the chain. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, cereal yields have been estimated at about **1.7 tonnes per hectare**, compared with a global figure closer to 4.2. Fertiliser application is around **17 kilograms per hectare**, against roughly 135 globally. About **6 per cent** of crop area is irrigated, compared with roughly 37 per cent in Asia. Agricultural research and development runs near **0.5 per cent** of agricultural GDP, against a 1 per cent benchmark (AGRA, 2023 to 2025).

These Sub-Saharan African continental averages conceal wide variation between commercial and smallholder systems. They describe the size of the gaps at continental level. The figures show production constrained by inputs, water timing, knowledge and capital that producers frequently cannot command. One estimate attributes roughly 75 per cent of recent output growth across Sub-Saharan Africa to area expansion and about 25 per cent to higher yield. Even when yield rises, post-harvest losses estimated at 30 to 40 per cent of total output across Sub-Saharan markets can absorb a material share of the gain before sale.

EXHIBIT 8

The cited benchmarks show persistent gaps in yield, inputs, water and research.

How to read: each pair compares an African average (light) with a global or regional benchmark (dark). The comparison shows relative scale and does not rank countries.



Source note: Data as at: 2023–2025 | **Geography:** Sub-Saharan Africa (continental average) | **Unit:** cereal yield (t/ha); fertiliser intensity (kg/ha); irrigated area (%); R&D intensity (% of AgGDP) | **Denominator:** continental aggregate (AGRA country-level data pooled) | **Sources used:** AGRA Africa Agriculture Status Reports 2023–2025 | **Status:** measured (reported national statistics; continental directional average, not country rankings). Benchmarks are global or Asian aggregates or policy targets, not individual-country comparators.

~75%

of recent Sub-Saharan production growth is estimated to come from **area expansion**, not yield (AGRA, 2021).

~25%

from **yield improvement**. Expansion of cultivated area does not itself raise productivity.

30–40%

of total output is lost after harvest across Sub-Saharan markets, with higher estimates for perishables, **before reaching a sale**.

Source note: Data as at 2021–2025 | **Geography:** Sub-Saharan Africa (continental) | **Unit:** share of output growth (%); post-harvest loss rate (%) | **Denominator:** aggregate crop production | **Sources used:** AGRA Africa Agriculture Status Reports 2021, 2023–2025 | **Status:** estimated (directional; post-harvest loss rates vary by crop, country and supply-chain formality)

WHY A YIELD GAIN NEED NOT BECOME MARGIN

A producer retains a rise in yield only where the extra output has a paying buyer, survives storage, meets a grade and is paid for before input debt falls due. A yield measure does not show the producer's margin. The evidence suggests that recent output growth has increased volume without showing that field-level economics improved.

AMARI CAPITAL & ADVISORY

THE FOOD ECONOMY

SOURCE NOTE: AGRA AFRICA AGRICULTURE STATUS REPORTS 2023–2025

VALUE CAPTURE ALONG THE CHAIN

A tool pays only where the operator keeps the value it releases.

Loss, trust and access are the three recurring constraints on value. A tool earns its return only when it relieves the binding constraint and the operator retains the value released.

EXHIBIT 9

A tool is only worth backing where it relieves a binding constraint and the operator captures the value released.

How to read: each column covers one recurring constraint. It shows what relieves the constraint, where the released value tends to accrue and whether the operator retains it.

Loss

Output destroyed between field and buyer.

- Warehousing and storage
- Cold chain; drying and processing
- Grading and sorting
- Inventory finance against stored stock

VALUE TENDS TO LAND

Value tends to accrue first to the stage holding the asset and inventory, then to the buyer.

CAPTURE TEST

Does the operator own the store, the grade and the receivable, or only advise on them?

Trust

Output cannot be verified or graded.

- Farm mapping and geolocation
- Chain-of-custody traceability
- Certification and quality testing
- MRV for compliance markets

VALUE TENDS TO LAND

Value tends to accrue at the verification and export stage, often offshore, while the farm gate receives less.

CAPTURE TEST

Does the operator hold the certificate and the premium, or pass it through downstream?

Access

Output cannot reach a paying buyer.

- Offtake and aggregation
- B2B procurement; logistics
- Embedded finance and buyer-led repayment
- Price discovery

VALUE TENDS TO LAND

Value tends to accrue to the stage holding the buyer relationship and the repayment rail.

CAPTURE TEST

Can the operator evidence retained buyers and collected receivables, not just reach?

Source note: Data as at: 2019–2025 | **Geography:** Sub-Saharan Africa (loss and access constraints); Ethiopia, Sidama zone (coffee traceability premium) | **Unit:** qualitative classification | **Denominator:** full food and export value chains | **Sources used:** analysis synthesis drawing on AGRA AASR 2019–2025, MDPI Agriculture 2023 (Ethiopia coffee traceability, DOI:10.3390/agriculture13020322), EU Deforestation Regulation | **Status:** illustrative analytical framework; adoption, reach and funded pilots are not capture evidence.

Ethiopia's coffee market shows why the capture test matters. In its commodity-exchange context, a natural experiment estimated that traceable coffee commanded roughly **33 per cent** higher export prices than non-traceable coffee, about US\$0.66 per kilogram (MDPI Agriculture, 2023). Yet **less than one-third** of that export premium reached the farm gate. Traceability relieved the trust constraint, but much of the released value accrued offshore at the export stage.

Part Two therefore ends with a capture test for technology. An operator must show that its tool improves a process, that it retains the released value and that the result is visible in audited evidence. Process gains passed through the chain become another party's margin. Farm-level activity bears much of the sector's risk and seldom retains the resulting margin.

CONTROL

Control the stage where value lands

Capture tends to require control of the store, grade, certificate, repayment rail or buyer contract. A platform that connects the ends of a chain may operate effectively while remaining **unproven on margin**.

EVIDENCE

Audited outcomes show whether value was captured

Capture must appear in audited margin, loss rates, utilisation, buyer retention or receivables. Adoption and funded pilots do not establish it. One cited East African sourcing platform reports linking roughly **17,000 farmers to 140,000 retailers**, yet no rigorous study has established a farmer-level price premium.

CORRIDOR

The corridor can improve access and trust

Where the corridor is involved, the diaspora can provide a **bridge to access, counterparties, trust and origination**. It does not measure the size of the opportunity. Access relieves a constraint but does not, by itself, capture value.

03

PART THREE

Operator Economics and Durability

Across the operators reviewed, audited margin and capital raised point in different directions. Control of a physical operating system appears more closely associated with durable, financeable economics.

FUNDING IS AN INPUT

The operators with the strongest audited results are not, in general, those that raised the most. Funding does not show performance.

EVIDENCE SEPARATES THE TIERS

The quality of the evidence separates an audited tier, an emerging-investable tier and an asset-light cautionary tier.

OPERATING CONTROL SUPPORTS MARGIN

Control of processing, storage, grading or a repayment rail tracks durable margin more closely than the sophistication of an application.

OPERATOR ECONOMICS AND DURABILITY

Audited margin is more closely associated with operating control than with capital raised.

Funding is often read as a measure of performance. Across the operators reviewed, however, **audited margin and capital raised point in different directions**. Control of a physical operating system appears more closely associated with durable economics.

30.9%

Audited operating margin at one listed integrated processor in Nigeria, reviewed in audited FY2024 accounts, on revenue near ₦1.53 trillion. One company, one year; not a sector average.

96%

Audited farmer repayment at a multi-country non-profit input-credit operator, on support and sales of about US\$261 million.

>US\$180m

Raised, distressed: one of several highly funded asset-light logistics and distribution platforms that experienced distress or restructuring by 2025; funding alone did not evidence durable economics.

Source note: 30.9% margin: audited annual report and Nigerian Exchange (NGX) filing, FY2024 (Audited). 96% repayment: reported FY2024 operating indicator, multi-country non-profit operator (East and Southern Africa); not an audited financial measure. Asset-light distress: operator filings and press reports (Reported). Full source matrix by operator and metric: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

A physical operating system includes processing assets, storage, grading, commodity receipts, input delivery or a repayment rail. The reviewed evidence associates control of these systems more closely with durable, financeable economics than with the amount of capital raised.

This finding defines a diligence test rather than a verdict on individual companies. Funding indicates investor confidence at a point in time, while performance requires demonstrated results across more than one good season. The analysis excludes figures that could not be supported by the cited sources, including for well-known operators.

The evidence separates operators into three tiers. The audited tier has accounts that can be read today. The emerging-investable tier has a credible model but no public

income statement. The asset-light cautionary tier combines material capital raised with distress and no demonstrated durable margin.

The operators with the strongest audited results are not, in general, those that raised the most. Several well-funded asset-light platforms did not overcome fragmented logistics and informal counterparties. Capital raised records investor confidence at a point in time. It does not show the presence of a physical or contractual asset that a lender can price.

The pages that follow examine each tier in turn. An originator can use the spectrum to screen the evidence, but not to rank the operators.

The three tiers describe evidence quality and the assets a financier can underwrite. They do not rank the operators.

AMARI'S VIEW

On the reviewed evidence, the bankable operator tends to control a physical or contractual asset that a lender can observe and price. The amount raised informs diligence but does not substitute for demonstrated cash flow.

OPERATOR ECONOMICS AND DURABILITY

In the audited tier, processing control converts into margin.

The audited tier is the first diligence pool because it is the only part of the sample with margin and repayment evidence drawn from filed accounts.

The audited tier is dominated by integrated processors. In audited FY2024 accounts, one listed integrated processor reported a **30.9% operating margin** on revenue near ₦1.53 trillion (one company, FY2024; not a sector average). That margin is high by global consumer-staples standards. The available evidence associates it with a captive domestic position in sugar and flour and control of conversion and distribution, rather than with a technology layer. This is the clearest evidence in the sample that asset-backed agribusiness margin can be bankable. It should not be presented as an agtech case.

The other listed processors show the same pattern at lower margins. A vertically integrated poultry processor in South Africa moved from an operating loss of about R621 million in FY2023 to operating profit above R1.1 billion in FY2024. The loss year coincided with bird-flu and power disruption to its physical system, rather than a commodity-price move. The swing suggests that margin depends on the condition of the operating system. A single-commodity sugar refiner in Nigeria provides the counterweight. Its gross margin compressed from about 28.7% to about 6.1% across comparable 2024

half-years as devaluation raised the cost of imported raw sugar. Processing control reduces some risks but does not remove exposure to input costs.

Scale alone does not lift margin. A multi-market integrated commodity operator recorded segment revenue of about S\$33.2 billion and segment EBIT near S\$1.02 billion in FY2024, an EBIT margin of roughly 3%. The largest single share of that EBIT, 37 per cent, came from processing and value-added activity rather than origination or merchandising. A diversified sugar-and-staples processor in South Africa reported revenue of about R26.0 billion at an EBITDA margin near 8.8%. Across these cases, margin accrues where the operator owns conversion. Its level reflects product mix and captive position more than balance-sheet size.

Audited evidence also covers smaller organisations. A non-profit input-credit operator across East and Southern Africa reported **96% farmer repayment** in audited FY2024 accounts. The controlled repayment channel is the bankable asset. The individual smallholder is not underwritten in isolation, and the non-profit result cannot be transferred directly to a for-profit cost of capital.

The integrated processor earns margin from owned refining, milling and distribution assets. Its audited conversion margin can support asset-backed credit and supplier finance.

A listed integrated processor

NIGERIA · NATIONAL SCALE · AUDITED ACCOUNTS

30.9%

audited operating margin, FY2024, on revenue near ₦1.53 trillion (EBITDA margin 31.6%; PAT about ₦266 billion). One company, one year; see Operator Evidence, this volume, for full source detail.

Controls sugar refining, flour milling, pasta, and domestic distribution across the full conversion and distribution system.

Deal-read The assets may support structured credit, supplier and trade finance, equipment finance and expansion advisory. Current pricing, tenor and security remain open.

The highest durable margin in the sample comes from owning the conversion step, not from a technology layer.

An audited input-credit operator

EAST & SOUTHERN AFRICA · NON-PROFIT · AUDITED

96%

farmer repayment in audited FY2024 accounts, on support and sales of about US\$261 million; roughly 2.1 million farmers served.

Controls input delivery, agronomy, market linkage, and a deduction-based repayment channel.

Deal-read The controlled repayment channel is the bankable asset. The non-profit structure means the result cannot be transferred directly to a for-profit cost of capital.

Repayment depends on the operating system around the loan as well as the borrower.

Source note: listed processor panel: audited annual report and Nigerian Exchange (NGX) filing, FY2024. Audited. One company, one year (Nigeria). **input-credit panel:** FY2024 audited annual accounts, multi-country non-profit operator (East and Southern Africa); development-finance-disclosed repayment rate. Full source matrix by operator and metric: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

~3%

Segment EBIT margin, multi-market operator, FY2024; mostly from processing.

R1.1 bn

Operating profit, South African poultry processor, FY2024; reversed prior loss.

OPERATOR ECONOMICS AND DURABILITY

Warehouse control is making aggregation financeable.

This tier requires more caution because almost every operator has a credible model but no public for-profit income statement.

A commodity-exchange and warehouse-receipt operator in Nigeria provides the strongest case in this tier. It is also active regionally. Its revenue is not disclosed. Filings record market turnover of about ₦63.72 billion in the first quarter of 2025 (exchange filing, Q1 2025) and roughly 526,850 tonnes traded in 2023. The operator reportedly placed what has been described as the region's first warehouse-receipt-backed commercial paper, of about **US\$50 million**, in 2021 (source: issuer and exchange filing, 2021; Reported). Converting warehouse control, grading and an electronic receipt into a negotiable instrument shows how verified inventory can become financeable collateral. Profitability and replication in Francophone West Africa remain open.

An aggregator-led smallholder franchise in northern Nigeria reaches the same tier through a different mechanism. Development-finance disclosures report repayment of about **99%** and roughly 42,500 active farmers. No public for-profit income statement is available, and sources conflict on the reported income multiplier (about 2.5 times in one source, about 3.5 times

in another). Neither multiplier is suitable for use. The disclosures show that the franchise can attract development-finance debt and sustain repayment, while profitability remains unverified. A development-finance-backed digital input-credit and insurance bundler in Kenya and Zambia has weaker evidence. Its company-reported reach near 350,000 farmers conflicts with an independent estimate nearer 300,000. Revenue, margin and default history are not disclosed. The model requires further investigation but does not yet provide an underwritable margin case. Further operators require careful comparison. A pay-per-use cold-storage operator owns its asset and reported hub-level profitability in 2018 and 2019. A plantation-to-refinery group reported FY2021 revenue of about FCFA 689 billion at a 14.6% operating margin, but these figures are not directly comparable with a listed subsidiary's later results. Any underwriting use must separate entity, year and commodity.

The 2021 commercial-paper placement shows that warehouse control, grading and electronic receipts can make verified inventory financeable even without a disclosed income statement.

A commodity-exchange operator

NIGERIA, REGIONAL · EXCHANGE & WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS

US\$50m+

warehouse-receipt-backed commercial paper (2021; issuer and exchange filing; Reported); ₦63.72bn turnover in Q1 2025 (exchange filing); ~526,850 tonnes traded (2023). Revenue not disclosed.

Controls physical warehouses, quality grading, electronic receipts, exchange rules, and a structured-finance product.

Deal-read Collateral visibility makes the aggregation model underwritable without a public income statement. Profitability and replication remain open.

Informal commodity flows become financeable when warehouse control and grading support a negotiable receipt that is legally recognised and enforceable.

An aggregator-led franchise

NORTHERN NIGERIA · DEVELOPMENT-FINANCE-BACKED

~99%

repayment (development-finance-disclosed); ~42,500 active farmers within a larger base. No public income statement; multiplier source-conflicted (~2.5x vs ~3.5x).

Controls input credit, training, harvest aggregation, storage, marketing, and deductions.

Deal-read The model has attracted development-finance debt but does not yet provide an underwritable margin case. For-profit margin, cohort retention and the default waterfall remain open.

Development-finance validation of repayment indicates model viability but does not establish profitability.

Source note: Commodity-exchange panel: issuer and exchange (SEC) filing, 2021 (commercial paper; Disclosed); exchange filing Q1 2025 (market turnover); revenue not publicly disclosed. One operator, Nigeria and regional. **Aggregator-franchise panel:** development-finance disclosures (IFAD, FMO, BII); no public income statement; income-multiplier source-conflicted, no single figure stated. Northern Nigeria. Full source matrix by operator and metric: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

OPERATOR ECONOMICS AND DURABILITY

Asset-light funding has not established durable performance.

The asset-light set has the widest gap between capital raised and demonstrated durable economics.

A widely funded B2B distribution platform in East Africa raised more than US\$180 million across its disclosed history. It never disclosed audited profitability and underwent restructuring, sizeable layoffs and suspension of its main-city operations in 2025. An asset-light road-freight brokerage in the region saw its reported valuation fall from roughly US\$120 million to about US\$5 million. A digital freight marketplace raised in excess of US\$86 million before its institutional investors exited. A farmer-network platform reached around two million users on roughly US\$20 million raised, then closed in 2022. Its scale did not produce a viable monetisation model or durable economics.

A mechanisation-as-a-service platform presents a milder version of the same problem. Its model includes asset tracking, pay-as-you-go finance and repayment records. Its headline

scale remains disputed. Company claims of about 2.5 million farmers and 6,500 farm-equipment owners exceed an independently confirmed figure nearer one million farmers and 4,500 tractors. Company-reported 7.2% net profitability with 0% credit losses is unverified and should be treated as aspirational.

These cases do not show that software is unimportant. They show that a matching layer without owned or contracted physical assets, enforceable receivables and repeat demand did not overcome fragmented fleets, road friction, working-capital strain and informal counterparties. The cold-storage operator provides the relevant contrast because it owns the asset.

>US\$180_m

Raised, then suspended: a B2B distribution platform (East Africa) halted its main-city operations in 2025, with no audited profitability ever disclosed. Press/filings; Reported.

US\$5_m

From about US\$120m: the reported valuation of an asset-light road-freight brokerage (East and West Africa), a distress signal rather than an operating metric. Press/filings; Reported.

>US\$86_m

Raised, investors exited: a digital freight marketplace (West and East Africa); founder reported to have bought the business back. Press/filings; Reported. See Operator Evidence, this volume.

Within this sample, the logistics archetype is bankable when the operator owns the physical asset and controls payment. A booking layer alone has not been bankable.

A distribution-platform operator co-ordinated producers and urban retailers through software and vehicles it did not control. By 2025, its main-city operations had been suspended. The suspension indicates that co-ordination software did not substitute for delivery reliability, pricing discipline or working-capital control.

A cold-storage asset owner
NIGERIA · PAY-PER-USE · HUB-LEVEL ACCOUNTS

Owns the asset

hub-level profitability reported for FY2018 and FY2019 (small, stale figures); current revenue not disclosed.

Controls owned solar cold-storage hubs charged on a per-crate, per-day basis at farm-gate and market.

Deal-read The figures indicate a margin mechanism but do not establish scale. They are small and stale, while the operator owns the physical asset and charges for use. This provides a positive counter-example to the logistics tier.

The small and stale figures remain interpretable because the operator owns the asset and charges for its use.

Asset-light platforms
EAST & WEST AFRICA · CAUTIONARY COMPOSITE

US\$180m+

raised by one distribution platform, then operations suspended (2025); a freight valuation fell ~US\$120m to ~US\$5m; a marketplace raised >US\$86m before investor exit.

Controls a booking or matching software layer, without owned assets or enforceable receivables.

Deal-read The available evidence does not support bankability. Underwriting would require an owned asset, a contracted route and an enforceable receivable.

Capital raised is an input. The matching layer did not overcome fragmented fleets.

Source note: distribution-platform, freight-brokerage, freight-marketplace and farmer-network figures: press reports and company filings, as at 2025 (Reported); no audited profitability disclosed by any of the four. Mechanisation-as-a-service scale and profitability: company disclosure, unverified (Reported). Cold-storage panel: hub-level accounts, FY2018–FY2019, stale. Full source matrix: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

EXHIBIT 10

A three-tier screen shows which operators the current evidence can support for underwriting.

The tiers assess **what the available evidence supports for underwriting**. They do not rank operators or their management quality. Each operator is placed by what can be verified today, without judging its eventual potential. Funding raised remains an input because it indicates investor confidence, a different variable from performance.

Audited tier Public or independently audited accounts; control of processing, distribution, or an audited repayment rail.	EVIDENCE PRESENT Filed revenue and margin: a 30.9% audited operating margin; an operating-loss-to-profit swing tied to physical disruption; a 96% repayment result reported as an operating indicator rather than an audited measure. EVIDENCE ABSENT Current lender pricing, tenor, and security packages; standalone African margin for multi-market parents. WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS Filed accounts show the margin, and independent evidence corroborates repayment. The remaining mandate is to price and secure that margin against current lender terms, tenor and security requirements.
Emerging-investable tier Credible, often development-finance-validated model with owned or contracted physical or contractual control.	EVIDENCE PRESENT A warehouse-receipt-backed commercial paper; development-finance-disclosed repayment near 99%; hub-level profitability (stale). EVIDENCE ABSENT For-profit income statements; verified active and paying users; evidence the model replicates in new markets. WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS The operating model is credible and often DFI-validated, although the for-profit income statement is not public. Diligence and structuring must establish a financeable income statement before capital can be sized.
Asset-light cautionary tier Software-led matching layer without owned assets, enforceable receivables, or repeat demand.	EVIDENCE PRESENT Capital raised; gross merchandise value; user reach; documented distress, valuation collapse, investor exit, or suspension. EVIDENCE ABSENT Any audited profitability; durable margin; enforceable security. WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS The evidence presented does not support underwriting. Capital raised, GMV and user reach indicate interest but do not show performance. Progress requires evidence of an owned asset, a contracted route and an enforceable receivable. Once those are present, the operator qualifies for the same test as every other operator.

UNDERWRITING REQUIRES THREE PIECES OF EVIDENCE

Underwriting should begin with the **audited number**, the **controlled asset** and the **named counterparty**. An operator with all three can be underwritten on its own accounts today. A narrative without these elements supports further diligence, not yet a transaction.

The spectrum changes with the evidence. An operator can move up when it provides an audited income statement, a disclosed security package or an independently confirmed user base.

Source note: AMARI Capital & Advisory operator-economics review; audited annual reports, exchange filings, and DFI disclosures as cited per operator. Evidence reflects the filing years stated. Full source matrix by operator and metric: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

OPERATOR ECONOMICS AND DURABILITY

The reviewed cases link bankability to a controlled asset, an audited number and a named counterparty.

The reviewed cases show three recurring patterns. Each clarifies what the evidence supports and the diligence required before a mandate can proceed.

The source of the headline number Diligence tends to confirm audited revenue, margin and independently disclosed repayment. Funding raised, GMV and reach rarely provide equivalent evidence.	AUDITED RESULTS PROVIDE STRONGER EVIDENCE THAN HEADLINE METRICS
What the operator controls In the reviewed cases, durable margin is associated with control of processing, storage, receipts, input delivery, repayment or compliance data. Software without control of an asset or payment remains weaker evidence.	ASSET CONTROL SUPPORTS MARGIN DURABILITY
The counterparty A named listed firm, DFI-backed operator, exporter, processor or warehouse-receipt sponsor can be underwritten as the counterparty. Unnamed platform users cannot.	UNDERWRITING APPLIES TO THE COUNTERPARTY, NOT TO PRODUCTION ALONE

The evidence suggests that the most durable operators sit at both ends of the spectrum. Cases in the middle still require diligence and do not yet support a transaction.

Where the accounts already exist UNDERWRITEABLE TODAY · FILED ACCOUNTS IN PLACE Work The mandate covers structured credit, supplier and trade finance, equipment finance and expansion advisory against filed accounts and controlled processing or distribution. Open question The remaining questions concern current lender pricing, tenor and the security package because the economics are already visible in filed accounts. <i>Filed accounts allow the mandate to focus on pricing and security.</i>	Where the income statement is the open question DILIGENCE AND STRUCTURING · FOR-PROFIT INCOME STATEMENT NOT YET PUBLIC Work The work is to test whether a credible, often DFI-validated operating model produces a financeable for-profit income statement. Confidence should remain qualified until the margin is public. Open question The open questions are for-profit margin, cohort retention, the default waterfall and whether the model replicates in a new market. <i>The implied income statement must be built before the model becomes a capital mandate.</i>
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Asset-light operators remain eligible for diligence. Evidence of an owned asset, contracted route and enforceable receivable moves an operator up under the same test. The tier determines the diligence required.

THREE PIECES OF EVIDENCE DETERMINE WHETHER UNDERWRITING CAN BEGIN Underwriting should begin with the audited number , the controlled asset and the named counterparty . A deal with all three can be underwritten. A narrative without them still requires diligence.
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Source note: All operator figures cited in this section are drawn from audited accounts, exchange filings, or DFI disclosures. Full provenance by operator and metric: see Operator Evidence, this volume.

Note on exclusions: one operator in active legal proceedings is excluded entirely; unsupported figures are omitted rather than estimated.

04

PART FOUR

Financing by Tier

The evidence suggests African agribusiness capital is constrained as much by risk pricing as by supply. Pricing differs by counterparty and can respond to catalytic support.

UNDERWRITING ECONOMICS CONSTRAIN CREDIT SUPPLY

Demand for agri-SME credit runs to roughly US\$90 billion a year, of which a large majority appears unmet. The evidence points to the economics of serving each counterparty as a binding constraint.

EACH COUNTERPARTY REQUIRES A DIFFERENT INSTRUMENT

A corporate processor, a mid-market enterprise and a smallholder reached through an aggregator require different credit assessments and instruments.

CATALYTIC CAPITAL CAN IMPROVE LENDER ECONOMICS

A partial guarantee or first-loss layer can move an SME loan from loss-making towards bankable. In the benchmarked facility, it appeared to mobilise more private capital per catalytic dollar than the global norm.

FINANCING BY TIER

Agribusiness capital constraints reflect both limited supply and different risk pricing by tier.

The evidence indicates risk pricing is as important as capital supply in

African agribusiness. Catalytic support can partly change the risk a commercial lender is asked to hold.

Demand for agri-SME credit in Sub-Saharan Africa runs to roughly **US\$90 billion a year**, with about 83 per cent unmet in SAFIN/industry estimates for 2024. A separate ISF/CASA 2022 estimate placed the Sub-Saharan agri-SME financing gap at roughly **US\$74 billion**, representing about 84 per cent of unmet demand. The estimates are indicative and vary by geography and methodology. At the small and medium tiers, underwriting economics constrain supply even where liquidity exists. Lenders must price atomised, undocumented cash flows while their net margin can fall below the local risk-free rate.

Several structures can partly change the pricing of that risk: a partial credit guarantee, a portfolio first-loss layer, warehouse control or an aggregator-owned repayment rail. They do not make credit cheap. They move part of the loss and reduce the variance a lender must reserve against. Some also reduce the cost of originating and monitoring a small ticket. The lender still prices country, currency and tenor risk. There is no single "African cost of capital". The rates that follow are specific to country, instrument, tenor and inflation. A nominal rate near 30 per cent on 30 per cent inflation carries a far lower real rate than 18 per cent on single-digit inflation. Counterparties must therefore be assessed within their country context. Observable and enforceable cash flows determine whether a transaction can proceed.

~US\$90_{bn}

Estimated annual **agri-SME credit demand** in Sub-Saharan Africa, with ~83% unmet. SAFIN/industry figure, 2024; not a precise census.

~US\$74_{bn}

ISF/CASA 2022 estimate of the **Sub-Saharan agri-SME financing gap**, representing ~84% of demand unmet.

-2.2%

Net lender margin on the **smallest tickets** (US\$10–25k), below a 16.2% Kenya government-bond benchmark (~2022–2024). Aceli/Dalberg; facility-specific.

A cost-of-capital figure is meaningful only when its country, year, currency and inflation basis are stated.

CORPORATE BORROWERS MAY ACCESS MARKET DEBT WHILE FARMS RELY ON SCHEME RAILS

Export-receipt and foreign-currency-denominated structured debt appears to price materially below local-currency debt when the repayment rail is offshore and the currency is matched. Counterparties that control assets may also issue securities. A private warehouse-receipt operator in West Africa is reported to have placed the continent's first receipt-backed commercial paper, raising more than **US\$50 million** for onward agri-SME lending in 2021.

Smallholder credit usually reaches farms through concessional and scheme rails. One national youth-agribusiness facility is reported to lend up to its currency cap at 8 per cent. A separate central-bank channel deployed roughly US\$435 million to cut agri lending rates from about 17 towards 10 per cent. Input-credit-in-kind carries no stated interest rate. The cost is embedded in input margin and a harvest offtake deduction, while the buyer deduction rail provides security instead of collateral.

AMARI'S VIEW

For agri-SMEs in Sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence points to risk pricing and enforcement costs as major constraints on credit. A structured catalyst can begin to improve lender economics.

EXHIBIT 11


The three-tier stack links bankability to observable and enforceable cash flows, with greater catalytic support required lower in the stack.

How to read: Each row describes one counterparty tier. Cost bands are indicative and anchored to a country and date, not continental constants. The catalyst column shows the instrument used to bring risk within commercial lending limits. Where that instrument is required, its absence prevents the loan from clearing.

Corporate INTEGRATED PROCESSORS, TRADERS	Listed or institution-grade operators may combine audited accounts with enforceable collateral, inventory or processing control, export receipts and repeat offtake. They are generally bankable on their own balance sheets and may also issue securities. One warehouse-receipt operator placed receipt-backed commercial paper at corporate-grade pricing. Senior secured debt · trade, inventory & receivables finance · receipt-backed paper CATALYST STILL NEEDED Little or none on assets; selective blended or first-loss cover only where entry, tenor or FX risk breaks pricing.	18–28% indicative local-currency nominal, market-specific; FX or export-receipt debt prices below
SME MIDSTREAM, WAREHOUSES, PROCESSORS	In the cited facility, lender returns on these loans fell below the risk-free benchmark without support. Aceli/Dalberg benchmarking of an East and Southern African agri-SME book reports net lender margins of +1.6% on US\$25–50k loans and –2.2% on US\$10–25k, measured against a 16.2% Kenya treasury benchmark (~2022–2024); results are facility-specific. Partial credit guarantee · first-loss · warehouse-receipt finance · receivables · origination incentives CATALYST STILL NEEDED Partial credit guarantees (~70–75% of principal) reduce the capital charge against default, not the borrowing rate; a ~5% first-loss layer and per-loan origination incentives can lift risk-adjusted returns above benchmark (Aceli; AGF; programme-reported).	+1.6 / –2.2% net lender margin by ticket (US\$25–50k / US\$10–25k) vs 16.2% Kenya treasury (~2022–2024)
Smallholder VIA AGGREGATOR	The aggregator is usually the bankable counterparty because it controls inputs, offtake and collections. Reported repayment performance informs pricing. Aggregator-led models report rates in the high nineties on disclosed figures, which are audited or DFI- corroborated and do not show profitability. Input-credit-in-kind · offtake-linked deduction · parametric cover · DFI securitisation CATALYST STILL NEEDED A proven aggregator repayment track record plus a loss buffer that carries the gap until that record is seasoned.	8–10% via concessional and scheme rails; input-credit-in-kind carries no APR, cost in input margin

CATALYTIC SUPPORT CAN IMPROVE SME LENDER ECONOMICS

A partial-credit guarantee covering **70–75%** of principal reduces the capital charge against default. It does not directly reduce the borrowing rate. Alongside a **2–9%** (~5% at portfolio level) first-loss layer and per-loan origination incentives, it can move an SME loan from loss-making towards bankable. On the benchmarked facility, this mobilised **~10×** per catalytic dollar (Aceli; programme-reported; OECD DAC case study; not independently audited; facility-specific), against an OECD DAC global average of ~4×



Source note: 2024 | East and Southern Africa (Aceli lender margins); Africa-wide (AGF guarantee terms) | net lender margin (%); nominal cost bands (%); catalyst coverage (%) | ~US\$4.5bn book, ~35 lenders, ~22,000 loans (Aceli); facility-specific | Aceli/Dalberg; AGF; operator-economics research | margins: measured; cost bands: indicative/market-specific; guarantee terms: programme-reported; repayment: audited/disclosed.

Source note: Aceli Africa/Dalberg benchmarking (lender-margin figures; ~35 lenders, ~US\$4.5bn East and Southern African agri-SME book; programme-reported; cited in an OECD DAC blended-finance case study); AGF and national scheme terms (guarantee coverage); OECD DAC global blended-finance estimates (~4× average); operator-economics research. **Caveat:** cost bands are indicative and market-specific; nominal rates sit on different inflation bases and are not comparable across countries. Margin and leverage figures are facility-specific. Repayment figures are audited or DFI-disclosed and do not evidence operator profitability.

EXHIBIT 12

One benchmarked agri-SME facility reports roughly ten dollars of private capital mobilised per catalytic dollar, above the OECD DAC global average.

How to read: The base represents one dollar of catalytic capital comprising the first-loss layer, guarantee and origination incentive. The other bars show the private capital mobilised. The dashed line marks the global blended-finance benchmark. The result is specific to this facility and does not show a continental rule.

Catalytic capital deployed

~5% first-loss + guarantee + origination incentive

\$1

US\$1

Private capital mobilised

OECD DAC global blended-finance average

~\$4

~4x

Private capital mobilised

Benchmarked agri-SME facility (Aceli; programme-reported)

~\$10 private capital per catalytic \$1

~10x

The uplift over the OECD DAC average is about 2.5x on this benchmarked facility. It reflects portfolio structuring and origination incentives and does not show a general rule.

A partial credit guarantee reduces the lender's exposure to default loss. By covering 70–75% of principal upon default, the guarantee reduces the capital a lender must hold against that default. The headline lending rate is not directly affected. National schemes in the two largest West African agri-finance markets cover up to 75% and up to 70% of principal and accrued interest respectively. A continent-wide fund operates in a comparable 50–75% band (Aceli; AGF; programme-reported).

Coverage terms, the claims process and origination incentive structure determine the effect on lender economics.

A portfolio first-loss layer absorbs initial losses. The benchmarked facility absorbs a first loss of 2–9%, averaging around 5% at portfolio level, with higher cover directed at segments where lender economics are worst. Paired with origination incentives, this can convert the negative-margin small-ticket segment into one a commercial lender will hold. The leverage figure remains specific to the facility.

Source note: 2024 | East and Southern Africa (Aceli agri-SME facility) | leverage ratio (x private capital per US\$1 catalytic) | ~US\$4.5bn book | Aceli/Dalberg; OECD DAC blended-finance case study (Aceli facility) | base catalytic capital: measured; ~10x leverage: programme-reported by Aceli (not independently audited), cited in an OECD DAC blended-finance case study; ~4x global average: OECD DAC estimate; facility-specific; not a continental average, do not extrapolate to West or Francophone Africa.

Source note: Aceli Africa/Dalberg (facility financial benchmarking; programme-reported by Aceli, not independently audited); OECD DAC blended-finance case study (Aceli facility, leverage ratios; ~10x figure cited); OECD DAC global blended-finance estimates (global ~4x average). **Caveat:** the ~10x figure is specific to one facility and lending geography and should not be extrapolated to West or Francophone Africa, or to other instruments; leverage ratios are sensitive to how "mobilised" is defined.

TWO INSTRUMENTS ADDRESS DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF RISK

Warehouse-receipt finance adjusts risk through the advance rate

Warehouse-receipt finance prices risk through the **advance rate** (the loan-to-value against stored commodity) rather than the interest rate. West African evidence suggests that lenders charge broadly the same nominal rate as on other commercial agri loans and vary the advance rate to absorb default. Verified custody and crop grade provide the security. The instrument fails where warehouse control cannot be independently confirmed.

Parametric cover applies at sovereign or portfolio level


Parametric cover operates only at the sovereign or portfolio level. A regional risk pool prices drought cover on a modelled index. One member pays on the order of **FCFA 1.5 billion** a year in premium, with drought-year payouts running to tens of millions of dollars. **Basis risk remains material:** the index can fail to pay a farmer whose crop failed because the model and field do not correlate perfectly. Parametric cover hedges a portfolio and does not protect each farm.

These instruments address risks other than those covered by the guarantee-and-first-loss stack for the SME tier. **Warehouse-receipt finance** secures a corporate or midstream loan against stored crop. **Parametric cover** hedges a portfolio or sovereign balance sheet against weather. They improve collateral quality and cover tail weather risk. They do not address the small-ticket origination economics that leave the smallest agri-SME loans below the risk-free rate.

EXHIBIT 13

Unsupported agri-SME loans at the smallest ticket sizes earn below the risk-free rate or lose money. A guarantee-plus-first-loss stack lifts the illustrative risk-adjusted return to the benchmark.

How to read: bars show indicative net lender margin by ticket size against the 16.2% government-bond benchmark. The hatched “after” state shows direction, not a precise post-catalyst yield. The catalyst absorbs losses and defrays origination costs, raising the risk-adjusted return while the lender continues to price country, currency and tenor.



The unsupported margins are measured from a benchmarked book of roughly US\$4.5bn across some 35 lenders and 22,000 loans. The “after” state shows direction only. The evidence suggests that a guarantee paired with a portfolio first-loss layer can make the segment bankable. It does not show a single post-catalyst margin. A guarantee transfers risk but does not, by itself, make a

loan cheap.

Source note: 2024 | East and Southern Africa (Aceli/Dalberg agri-SME book) | net lender margin (%) vs 16.2% risk-free benchmark | ~US\$4.5bn book, ~35 lenders, ~22,000 loans | Aceli/Dalberg | unsupported: measured; PCG + first-loss: directional illustration.
Source note: capital-pricing research; facility financial benchmarking (35 lenders, ~22,000 loans, ~US\$4.5bn book), 2024. **Caveat:** “before” is measured; “after” is directional.

The evidence suggests that aggregation can make smallholder lending bankable by shifting the underwritten counterparty from atomised production to an operator that controls repayment, inventory, quality and buyer access.

PROVEN AGGREGATOR REPAYMENT CARRIES THE PRICE AT THE SMALLHOLDER TIER

A non-profit input-credit aggregator
SINGLE-BUYER INPUT-CREDIT MODEL, IN-KIND

96%

Farmer repayment of 96% is reported for FY2024 as an operating indicator outside the audited financial statements. The repayment rail consists of inputs advanced on credit and recovered through a harvest offtake deduction. Collateral does not secure the credit.

The repayment rate does not establish profitability. The two measures should remain separate.

A franchise-cooperative aggregator
FRANCHISE PLATFORM, DFI-FINANCED

~99%

Development-finance documentation discloses repayment in the high-nineties in the available sources. Buyer-controlled collections provide the security.

The figures are source-specific. Income-multiplier claims vary by discloser, and none attributes the result solely to finance.

The aggregator’s seasoned repayment record may support underwriting. A time-bound loss buffer carries the gap until it is proven.

Source note: Aggregator repayment: FY2024 (96%, operating indicator); disclosed (~99%) | Sub-Saharan Africa (varied operator archetypes) | repayment rate (%) | operator-specific | AMARI operator-economics research; audited accounts; DFI disclosures | audited / DFI-disclosed.

FINANCING BY TIER

Each tier requires different evidence of enforceable repayment.

Each tier is underwritten on a different counterparty. The evidence that can move a deal from a sector story to an enforceable repayment path therefore differs by tier.

Corporate INTEGRATED PROCESSORS, TRADERS	SME MIDSTREAM, WAREHOUSES, PROCESSORS	Smallholder VIA AGGREGATOR
- Before setting tenor, confirm audited financials, collateral control and enforceable warehouse or asset security. - Test buyer concentration and offtake visibility. Price working-capital velocity and covenants to the cash cycle. Match currency: favour export-receipt or FX-denominated structured debt where the repayment rail is offshore. - Treat land tenure as transaction diligence by testing collateral enforceability and asset recovery. A reform narrative is not sufficient.	- Establish a defined, enforceable repayment path. A sector story does not provide one. - Verify inventory and warehouse control independently. For warehouse-receipt finance, set risk through the advance rate rather than the headline rate. - Calibrate guarantee cover and first-loss to the gap so the risk-adjusted return clears the local risk-free benchmark. - Confirm management accounts, digital repayment rails and local enforceability of security.	Underwrite the aggregator. Require season-repeat data and audited or DFI-corroborated repayment rather than relying on the farmer alone. - Verify input delivery, side-selling controls and buyer deduction rights. The deduction rail provides the security. - Where weather risk is material, add index cover and state basis risk plainly. The index may not pay a farmer who has lost the crop. - Treat catalytic loss protection as a time-bound bridge to a proven track record, with an explicit end date.

BANKABILITY DEPENDS ON THE TIER

No single instrument makes every tier bankable. Assets support the corporate tier. The SME tier becomes bankable when a guarantee and a first-loss layer together change the pricing of a negative margin above the risk-free benchmark. The smallholder tier becomes bankable only after an aggregator’s repayment data is proven, with a loss buffer carrying the gap until then. Catalytic capital should be priced and timed as a bridge to a track record, with a defined end date.

EXHIBIT 14

The diligence sequence reaches bankability only when repayment can be observed and enforced.

How to read: each successive row adds an element of enforceability. The shaded row is the first point at which a catalyst makes the exposure commercially bankable.

STATE OF THE COUNTERPARTY	WHAT IT STILL LACKS	WHAT CLOSES THE GAP
Atomised smallholder Production only	Production exists; no documented cash flow, no collateral, no repayment rail	Observability and enforceability, closed by aggregation under an operator
Aggregator with control Where many stall	Controls inputs, offtake and collections; some season-repeat data	Proof the control converts to repayment: verified delivery, side-selling controls, buyer deduction rights
Aggregator with track record Bankable with a catalyst	Demonstrated repayment (e.g. 96% audited; ~99% disclosed)	A loss buffer until the record is fully seasoned: PCG / first-loss bridge
SME / midstream operator Negative unit economics	Observable cash conversion, inventory, buyer contracts; economics still negative on small tickets	First-loss cover (about 5%) plus origination incentive; partial guarantees more commonly cover about 50% of losses after recovery
Corporate counterparty Bankable on assets	Audited accounts, collateral, export receipts; can issue paper	Commercial debt; selective blended cover for situational FX, tenor or entry risk only

Source note: schematic framework; specific metrics: FY2024 (96% repayment, audited); disclosed (~99%) | Sub-Saharan Africa (operator archetypes; varied countries) | repayment rate (%); diligence progression (qualitative) | operator-specific, not sector averages | AMARI operator-economics research; audited accounts; DFI disclosures | progression: schematic; repayment rates: audited/disclosed.

Source note: capital-stack-by-tier and operator-economics research. **Caveat:** the bridge is a diligence sequence, not a guaranteed path; many aggregators stall at the control stage because control does not convert to enforceable repayment.

EXHIBIT 15

Five types of capital reach different tiers, but the SME origination tier remains structurally underserved.

How to read: each card sets out the practical deployment profile and the remaining gap. This is a structural bottleneck. Small-ticket origination is expensive, thinly evidenced and hard to price without a catalyst.

Development finance institutions

Bilateral and multilateral DFIs

Finance Tier 1 corporates directly and reach Tier 2 through partial credit guarantees. Published national schemes cover **50–75%** of principal.

Gap: coverage clusters where public evidence and partner infrastructure are strongest.

Blended finance vehicles

First-loss and incentive facilities

These vehicles are designed for the SME origination tier. One East African facility mobilised about **10x** private capital per catalytic dollar, compared with a global blended-finance benchmark near 4x.

Gap: the capital mobilised per dollar is material, but remains far below the estimated annual SME financing gap.

Private equity and venture capital

Growth funds and impact equity

Funded agritech, logistics and embedded-finance companies through 2014–2024. Equity flows contracted sharply in 2025. Operators that control physical infrastructure and report audited economics tend to be exchange-listed rather than VC-funded.

Gap: venture reach did not consistently produce durable operating control.

Corporate and strategic investors

Processors, traders, commodity buyers

Deploy capital through balance sheets, processing expansion and outgrower programmes. Such investment follows established corridors and proven supply bases.

Gap: it rarely creates new Tier 2 origination in unproven geographies.

Commercial banks

Local-currency lenders and trade-finance desks

Finance Tier 1 asset-backed and listed corporates. Below that tier, they struggle without a catalyst. Facility benchmarking shows net lender margins of **+1.6%** on US\$25–50k loans and **–2.2%** on US\$10–25k loans, measured against a 16.2% risk-free alternative.

Gap: the SME tier needs guarantee, first-loss or origination support before the economics clear.

Capital is available, but a structural gap remains at the SME origination tier. ISF/CASA 2022 estimates the Sub-Saharan agri-SME financing gap at about **US\$74bn per year**, or roughly **84%** of demand unmet. Wider published ranges vary by scope and methodology.

Source note: ISF/CASA 2022; Aceli/Dalberg facility benchmarking; OECD Aceli case study; NIRSAL, GIRSAL and AGF guarantee terms; sector trackers for agritech equity flows. Facility and guarantee figures are scheme-specific, not continental averages.

Capital coverage differs by tier. The corporate tier is anchored, purpose-built SME vehicles remain small against the gap, and the smallholder tier is reached at scale only through an aggregator.

SEQUENCE

Capital follows the tier it was built for

Development finance and commercial banks sit with the corporate counterparty; blended vehicles are purpose-built for the SME tier; equity and strategic capital follow proven corridors rather than opening new ones.

CEILING

Scale is the binding constraint

A facility mobilising ~10x per catalytic dollar can still remain small against demand. The estimated annual gap is **US\$74bn**.

CAVEAT

Scheme figures do not represent continental averages

The guarantee coverage, leverage ratios and lender margins cited here are specific to individual facilities and countries.

05

PART FIVE

The Australia to Africa Corridor

Documented transactions remain limited. In the near term, the corridor's value appears to lie in origination and advisory rather than an existing pipeline.

THE TRANSACTION RECORD IS LIMITED

Documented Australia to Africa agribusiness transactions are limited. A credible flow would need to be originated because the existing record does not show one.

SOME CAPABILITIES CAN TRANSFER

The evidence suggests that knowledge, agronomy, post-harvest capability, biosecurity and compliance can transfer. Capital-intensive broadacre models are less likely to transfer directly.

CURRENT PRIORITIES DIFFER

Origination and compliance services appear suitable for current work. Agri-carbon remains a watch item. The diaspora is a bridge to access and trust, never a measure of the sector's size.

THE AUSTRALIA TO AFRICA CORRIDOR

The documented corridor remains thin, and its near-term value lies in origination.

The near-term value of the Australia to Africa agribusiness corridor appears to lie in origination and advisory. The documented record does not show a repeatable transaction flow.

The evidence does not support describing the corridor as a ready flow of capital and trade between two food systems. Documented Australia to Africa agribusiness transactions are limited. The few traceable transactions tend to concentrate in mining-adjacent services, education and isolated commodity trades, with no repeatable agribusiness flow yet visible.

The constraint is material. The most visible documented corridor commitment is ACIAR’s Africa-Australia agricultural research and capacity programme (AAPCRA), at roughly **A\$76.4 million** running from 2024 to 2030. Its first-year bilateral research funding of about A\$11.9 million is directed at agriculture relevant to African systems. The programme supports research and capacity-building. It does not fund procurement and should not be treated as a supplier channel. Beyond it, the evidence consists of scattered single-firm activity. The most concrete commercial signal is one Australian irrigation-automation firm’s North African memorandum, whose value remains undisclosed until a priced contract is evidenced.

In AMARI’s judgement, based on the evidence reviewed, every plausible entry point runs through a local integration partner. The research programme is the only entity in the reviewed evidence that has built those partnerships at scale.

The commercial corridor therefore does not yet exist independently of the aid-and-research channel. The underlying commercial case remains, but an established flow and its commercial pathway have not been built. An advisory firm could originate the counterparty and match the capability. It could then structure the local-partner path and price the mandate.

The judgement concerns the volume of documented, priced private transactions. It does not assess the depth of the underlying demand logic. That logic rests on shared dryland agronomy and water scarcity, together with comparable livestock and post-harvest problems. The Australian agritech companies reviewed are raising capital into North America and Europe rather than Africa. No public source identified here prices Australia to Africa agritech-services revenue. The absence of a public figure does not show zero revenue or preclude private transactions. The following page measures the merchandise corridor separately.

Existing relationships may lower the cost of the first transactions. They provide a route to access and trust only. They do not size the sector, and diaspora figures do not measure the opportunity discussed here.

~A\$**76.4m**

Publicly funded research programme to 2030 that anchors the documented record. **This one programme does not establish a flow.**

~A\$**11.9m**

First-year bilateral research funding within it. **The funding supports research and capacity-building. It does not fund procurement.**

Not priced

No public source identified here prices Australia to Africa agritech-services revenue. **The absence of a source does not establish a zero.**

AMARI’S VIEW

On the available evidence, the near-term value of this thin documented corridor lies in originating counterparties and structuring local partnerships.

THE AUSTRALIA TO AFRICA CORRIDOR

Australia’s agri-food merchandise trade with African partners is small beside its main Asian corridors.

Using the same source, Australia’s 2024 two-way agri-food merchandise trade with African partners was US\$1.148 billion. The five largest Asian partner corridors totalled US\$24.011 billion. The African corridor was 4.8 per cent of that benchmark.





EXHIBIT 16

A small set of partners and staple lines carries most of the measured corridor.

How to read: the benchmark uses the same BACI release, year and HS01–24 scope for both groups.



Concentration. Egypt, South Africa and Mauritius account for 68.2 per cent of the measured African corridor. The five displayed HS6 lines account for 54.4 per cent. The measured merchandise corridor therefore appears narrow and concentrated.

Data as at 2024 | Australia with African partners; Asian comparator | current US\$, two-way merchandise trade, HS chapters 01–24 | source: CEPII BACI v202601, HS 2022 revision, released 22 January 2026 and accessed 16 July 2026 | measured reconciled trade flows; AMARI Capital & Advisory aggregation. BACI is licensed under Etalab Open Licence 2.0.

THE FIGURES EXCLUDE SERVICES

BACI is a reconciled derivative of UN Comtrade, and its latest year may be revised. It covers merchandise only. No public source identified here prices an Australia to Africa agritech-services corridor, so services remain outside the figure.

EXHIBIT 17

Knowledge and compliance systems transfer more readily than capital-intensive technology designed to replace labour.

Australian and African food systems differ materially in their factor endowments. Under the standard induced-innovation reading, technology transfers more readily when its value does not depend on the endowment that differs. **Knowledge and compliance tend to transfer. Capital-for-labour substitution generally does not.**

TENDS TO TRANSFER → Knowledge, agronomy and adapted genetics → Post-harvest, storage and processing capability → Origination, structuring and advisory capability	TENDS NOT TO TRANSFER DIRECTLY × Capital-intensive broadacre mechanisation × Models assuming labour scarcity and scale × Turnkey technology without local agronomy
TENDS TO TRANSFER → Biosecurity and food-safety systems → Traceability and compliance infrastructure	TENDS NOT TO TRANSFER DIRECTLY × Input packages priced for high-income farms × Equipment with no local service or parts base

Source note: schematic | Australia and Sub-Saharan Africa (factor endowments; smallholding scale) | qualitative directional assessment | n/a; framework, not a scored index | corridor-pipeline research; Hayami–Ruttan induced-innovation framework (1971) | illustrative; transfer potential depends on local adaptation and is not guaranteed.
Directional reading based on relative factor endowments (Hayami–Ruttan induced-innovation hypothesis). **Sources used:** corridor-pipeline research; induced-innovation literature.

The reasoning predates the corridor. Hayami and Ruttan’s induced-innovation hypothesis holds that successful agricultural technology responds to relative factor prices. Agricultural systems tend to economise on factors that are scarce and costly. Australian agriculture is land-abundant, labour-scarce and capital-intensive. Over a century, it has developed machinery that substitutes for people across large holdings.

Conditions in much of Sub-Saharan African food production differ, with land more constrained, labour comparatively abundant and capital expensive. Technology designed to relieve labour scarcity may not address a binding constraint in many Sub-Saharan African settings. It may instead add cost without improving the economics. The more transferable parts of the Australian system are endowment-neutral. They include genetics and agronomy

adapted to local agro-ecology, post-harvest and processing capability, biosecurity discipline, and the traceability and compliance systems that buyers increasingly require. Advisory and origination capability may transfer for the same reason.

Scale sharpens the distinction. Australian broadacre precision-agriculture returns have been documented on farms averaging several thousand hectares. They cannot be assumed to carry to smallholdings of one to two hectares, where capital economics, labour conditions and fragmentation differ materially. The Australian record suggests that productivity gains came more from institutional architecture, levy-funded research co-investment and export-market quality discipline than from a single technology. Those institutional features appear more transferable than the machinery.

A\$11.60–60/ha

Documented Australian broadacre precision-agriculture returns. **These returns depend on scale and do not transfer directly to 1–2 ha smallholdings.**

3,500–4,000 vs 1–2 ha

Australian farm scale against the smallholder average. **The operating conditions differ materially.**

The transfer rule filters technologies. It does not rank them. **The central gate is absorption capacity.** A capability travels only where a local counterparty has the asset base, cash flow and buyer channel to absorb it. The model must also address the binding local constraint at a bankable cost. Technical sophistication is secondary to an operating system that addresses that constraint.

The diaspora is a bridge to access and trust, not a measure of the market.

A community with standing in both systems can make counterparties legible and reduce the cost of a first transaction. This creates an advantage in access and trust. It does not measure the sector.

The differences set out in the previous exhibit raise the cost of acting across the corridor. Counterparties are harder to assess, references are harder to check, and the first transaction carries diligence costs that repeated transactions could amortise. Relationships can partly reduce that cost. A diaspora that lives in the Australian system and retains standing in an African one can introduce and verify counterparties, interpret local context, and reduce the time required to establish whether an operator is what it claims to be.

This advantage matters most in origination, where the corridor’s near-term value appears to lie. A trusted introduction can make an unknown counterparty assessable. Local standing can surface references that a remote investor might struggle to obtain, while shared context can shorten the path from first contact to a diligence pack an underwriter will read. These effects may reduce origination costs at the margin.

The relational bridge improves **access and trust**. It cannot establish demand, underwrite an operator’s economics or size the opportunity. Diaspora population, remittance value and community scale are demographic measures. They cannot establish an addressable agribusiness market. Using them for that purpose would substitute a population measure for a commercial one.

Diaspora reach is an input to origination. It should be assessed transaction by transaction and proven through transactions that clear diligence. It cannot be used as a proxy for the sector’s size, depth or bankability. Any estimate of the opportunity must come from operator economics and documented flows. A party with standing in both systems can vouch, interpret and convene, which may help convert a research relationship or a memorandum into a priced mandate.


WHAT THE BRIDGE IS	WHAT THE BRIDGE IS NOT
→ A route to access: opening the first conversation → A route to trust: making a counterparty legible → A way to vouch, interpret and convene across systems → A lever that lowers first-transaction cost at the margin	× Not a measure of the agribusiness sector’s size × Not a proxy for demand or a potential market × Not, on its own, a creator of demand × Not a substitute for operator economics in sizing ×

Diaspora relationships can improve access and trust. Sector size must come from documented flows and operator economics.

EXHIBIT 18

The pool of eligible producers narrows sharply before an EUDR-compliant consignment can be documented.

The European Union Deforestation Regulation requires plot-level geolocation and a deforestation-free claim for covered commodities. The applicable dates are **30 December 2026** for large and medium operators and **30 June 2027** for micro and small operators. The deadline has shifted twice from the original date of 30 December 2024. The European Commission’s May 2026 review confirmed no further delay. Each stage below excludes producers who cannot meet the next evidentiary requirement.



In Côte d'Ivoire, about 58 per cent of the covered population (~1,165 of ~2,000 authorised operators, cooperatives and buyers) had been integrated into the national traceability system (SNT) as at end-2024, against a requirement of full coverage. Denominator: registered operators, cooperatives and buyers, not production volume; the informal channel (independent buyers outside cooperative structures) is not captured. The ~58% figure is the one source-measured data point; the other levels shown are schematic ranges, not independently measured.

Source note: Data as at end-2024 | Côte d'Ivoire | share of ~2,000 registered operators, cooperatives and buyers with SNT integration (~1,165) | measured. **Sources used:** CCC/EFI EUDR Preparedness Check (zerodeforestationhub.eu, October 2025); AIP Ivory Coast (aip.ci, October 2025). Other funnel stages: schematic illustrative narrowing, not independently measured. Additional: European Commission EUDR guidance (environment.ec.europa.eu); EUDR Navigator enforcement tier rates. Cost benchmarks: Profundo, “The Costs of EUDR Compliance for Cocoa”, 5 Feb 2025 (primary, independent; EUR/t ranges derived from Profundo revenue-share model, converted estimates, not observed invoices); Fern, June 2024 (cooperative-level); Trase.earth, Mar 2025 (~EUR 47/t cooperative management fee; sector estimate, not audited). USD 5–10/farmer geolocation: Ethiopia coffee smallholders (OCFCU), not Côte d'Ivoire cocoa.

The service opportunity lies between the wide top of the funnel and its narrow base. Market access depends on the ability to **evidence** production to a European buyer’s satisfaction, and most producers in scope cannot yet do so. Closing this gap requires plot mapping, geolocation capture, deforestation screening against the cut-off date, and a due-diligence statement an importer can rely on.

This compliance line is ready to build because the evidentiary obligation persists when enforcement dates change. Every consignment requires a filed due-diligence statement with plot-level geolocation. Because this work is endowment-neutral, it can transfer across the corridor. It also protects market access because a consignment that cannot file a statement cannot enter the European

market, regardless of quality. The evidence suggests that returns may arrive sooner and vary less than the carbon flows discussed next, although field execution risk remains material.

The first operator placing goods on the EU market bears the central obligation. Origin exporters may therefore be counterparties with both the exposure and the budget. Application extends to micro and small operators from **30 June 2027**. Enforcement carries penalties of up to **4% of EU-wide annual turnover** plus confiscation, with annual inspection rates benchmarked at 9, 3 and 1% of operators by country risk tier (European Commission and Reuters guidance). The service provides advice and does not certify compliance.

EUR10–25/t
Cost-to-comply for formal chains; **EUR 30–60/t for informal chains.** Costs differ by chain type.

USD5–10/farmer
Ethiopia coffee smallholders (OCFCU); benchmarked geolocation cost. **This informs programme costs. It is not a Côte d'Ivoire cocoa benchmark.**

~EUR47/t
Sector cooperative-management fee benchmark. **This sector estimate has not been audited.**

THE AUSTRALIA TO AFRICA CORRIDOR

Compliance is ready to build, while carbon economics remain unsettled.

The corridor supports action where a counterparty, deadline and budget are visible. Areas that still depend on unresolved policy or methodology remain on watch.

The evidence supports near-term work when the horizon is fixed, the budget holder is identifiable and the work is defined. EUDR compliance readiness meets that test because the deadline and readiness gap are visible. Origination and advisory work may also qualify when a local operator, buyer or programme owner is named.

Agri-carbon requires a longer horizon because farmer-level economics are thin and the relevant agriculture and soil methodologies remain unsettled, despite real physical flows. It should remain an addition to compliance or buyer-premium work rather than a standalone 24-month position.

The physical flows are real, but farmer-level economics and methodology remain unsettled. That is why agri-carbon remains on watch.

BUILD NOW · EVIDENCE SUPPORTS ACTION

Origination and advisory

The evidence indicates demand, but few routes convert it into commercial work. The task is to identify operators with auditable economics, structure access, and use relationships to lower origination cost.

WHAT SUPPORTS ACTION: DOCUMENTED DEMAND, DEFINED WORK, IDENTIFIABLE COUNTERPARTY.

Compliance readiness (EUDR)

EUDR gives relevant exporters a defined preparation window. Research from one origin covered about 58% of cooperatives against a 100% requirement, with compliance costs benchmarked near EUR 10–60 per tonne.

WHAT SUPPORTS ACTION: FIXED HORIZON, NAMED BUDGET-HOLDER, DOCUMENTED GAP.

36-MONTH WATCH · EVIDENCE NOT YET SETTLED

Agri-carbon and natural capital

The live agroforestry carbon programme with the strongest evidence in this review delivered income in the order of **EUR 7 per enrolled farmer per year**, or about **EUR 17 per selling farmer per year**. The resulting income is supplemental and does not support a standalone bankable line.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED: APPROVED METHODOLOGY, AUTHORISED TRANSFER, EVIDENCED PRICE.

Article 6 transfer infrastructure

Ghana and Switzerland completed an Article 6.2 ITMO transfer in 2025, reported at 11,733 units, but most bilateral agreements remain pre-operational. Current public analysis indicates that Australia has not authorised ACCUs for international transfer as ITMOs.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED: REPEAT CLEARED AGRICULTURAL TRANSFERS.

Source note: corridor, compliance and operator-economics research, 2026. EUR 7–17 per farmer per year: Rabobank Acorn / Farm Africa, Embu and Tharaka Nithi, Kenya, 2020–2023; 21,658 enrolled farmers, 7,375 selling farmers, 24,945 carbon removal units sold. Article 6.2 ITMO transfer: KliK / Carbon Pulse reporting. ACCU/ITMO status: Columbia CGEP.

READING CAVEAT

The build/watch split does not forecast outcomes. **Available evidence supports two build-now lines:** a commercialisation gap in origination and a fixed compliance deadline for EUDR. Each watch item requires a named event before it moves to build-now. Agri-carbon requires an approved methodology and evidenced price, while Article 6 requires a repeat cleared transfer.

Act only where current evidence supports a transaction. Reassess the watch items as transactions clear.

TESTING AN OPPORTUNITY

One live counterparty can be tested against the deal screen.

This worksheet provides a first-pass screen rather than a rating. A score of 0 means absent, 1 means plausible but not evidenced, and 2 means evidenced by records. A stop gate below 2 requires further proof before the deal can be structured.

COUNTERPARTY / DEAL		COUNTRY / CHAIN	INSTRUMENT / TIER	REVIEWED BY / DATE
Operating control: sell, supply, hold grade, hold the base.		Margin not reach: retained cash and collectable repayment.		Capital and corridor fit: instrument, catalyst, named demand.

LENS	QUESTION TO EVIDENCE	SCORE 0/1/2	PASS	COUNTERPARTY EVIDENCE / NOTE
OPERATING CONTROL STOP	Repeat buyer demand Commercial orders recur across seasons, beyond pilots, grants or letters of intent.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
OPERATING CONTROL STOP	Delivery reliability Volume and timing remain within agreed tolerance across a full season.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
OPERATING CONTROL STOP	Supply base holds Side-selling remains low, deliveries recur and repayment does not require heavy enforcement costs.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
OPERATING CONTROL	Grade and premium captured The operator retains a net price linked to the quality gain.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
OPERATING CONTROL	Productive asset hours Storage, fleet, processing or irrigation assets generate paid utilisation.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
OPERATING CONTROL	Active paying base Paying customers, cohort retention and take rate are reported separately from reach.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
MARGIN NOT REACH	Cash conversion The working-capital cycle shortens, or financing improves, as volume rises.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
MARGIN NOT REACH STOP	Collection rail Where credit is present, repayment runs through a controlled rail or an offtake deduction.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
MARGIN NOT REACH	Compliance economics The cost bearer, access benefit and premium recipient are identified.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
CAPITAL-STACK FIT	Secure collateral Inventory, title, a receivable or warehouse receipt remains enforceable.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
CAPITAL-STACK FIT	Instrument matches tier Risk for corporate, SME or smallholder-via-aggregator tiers is priced honestly, and any catalyst is named.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	
CORRIDOR DISCIPLINE	Named demand The Australia-to-Africa case has a buyer or operator with budget and a feasible delivery partner.	☐ ☐ ☐	☐ Y/N	

DECISION ☐ Stop ☐ Structure ☐ Proceed	NEXT PROOF REQUIRED 	OWNER / DUE DATE
--	--------------------------------	-----------------------------

This worksheet applies the twelve-question routine to diligence. It sets a higher threshold than a narrative summary because operating control and collection are gates.

OUTLOOK

Three near-term signals could change the corridor position.

This analysis is the first in the Corridor Series and reflects a point-in-time judgement. A small number of signals could change it over the next twelve to thirty-six months. These watch items are not forecasts. Each states what would confirm the current reading and what would invalidate it. None has yet resolved on the available evidence.

EUDR enforcement timing and evidence costs may shape the compliance opportunity.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

The current reading would be confirmed if enforcement dates hold, geolocation and land-use evidence becomes a recurring operating cost, and compliant operators capture or retain buyer access.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

It would fail if enforcement were deferred again, scope narrowed, or geolocation and land-use evidence costs fell enough to remove the advantage.

HORIZON 12–24 MONTHS

Aggregator-led repayment remains untested across a full cycle.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

Evidence would need to show that high repayment survives a drought year, a price shock and a side-selling temptation, beyond a good season.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

The reading would fail if repayment collapsed when the spot price moved or the rains failed.

HORIZON 12–36 MONTHS · CYCLE-DEPENDENT

The corridor case depends on a transaction clearing diligence.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

At least one transaction would need to pass the twelve-question routine, with named demand, a feasible delivery path and a structure that prices honestly.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

The reading would fail if the pipeline remained at the level of interest and intent because the market could not be validated. The corridor currently rests on analogy and origination advantage. No closed deal supports it.

HORIZON 18–36 MONTHS · THIS ITEM IS MOST LIKELY TO SETTLE THE CORRIDOR POSITION

ISSUE 01 OF FIVE

The three watch items above can each be observed within thirty-six months. Together, they test the operating-systems reading in the near term. The following page addresses three slower structural questions that may limit the potential market. The Movement of Money, the next study, examines whether capital can reach those tiers. Concrete & Capital, later in the Corridor Series, examines the public infrastructure that private operators depend on but cannot build alone.

OUTLOOK

The three remaining signals move more slowly and affect a wider area. They will shape how much of the opportunity is addressable and lead into the next issue.

Agri-carbon income will depend on stronger methodology and integrity.

Early Article 6 authorisations and aggregator-held programmes indicate that smallholder carbon income has begun to flow. The monitoring, reporting and verification base remains thin.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

Monitoring, reporting and verification becomes standardised, registries maintain their integrity, and smallholder carbon cashflow proves durable.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

Integrity concerns, methodology disputes or buyer withdrawal strand the early projects.

HORIZON 24–36 MONTHS · WATCH-LIST, WITH NO IMMEDIATE INVESTMENT CASE

Tier-level evidence must show how the cost of capital differs.

The current reading places a structural finance gap at the SME and smallholder tiers, while the corporate tier remains funded. Blended catalysts are intended to bridge that gap.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

Instrument-level evidence establishes a cost-of-capital curve by tier, and blended structures continue to attract private capital across cycles.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

Catalytic capital does not attract the intended private capital, leaving the gap unchanged.

HORIZON 24–36 MONTHS · THE LINK TO ISSUE 02

Public infrastructure will determine how widely private investment can proceed.

Private deal economics depend on public infrastructure: the digital trade backbone, land registries, wholesale markets and roads. No private operator can build this infrastructure alone.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM

Corridor geographies make visible progress on single-window customs, land registration and interoperable trade data.

WHAT WOULD KILL IT

Public infrastructure stalls, leaving few bankable private opportunities even where an individual operator performs well.

HORIZON 36 MONTHS AND BEYOND · THIS SIGNAL DETERMINES THE SIZE OF THE ADDRESSABLE SPACE

THE NEXT ISSUE FOLLOWS THE CAPITAL QUESTION

Issue 01 finds that the food economy depends on reliable physical and institutional systems. The unresolved question is whether capital can reach the tiers where those systems operate. **The Movement of Money**, the next study in the Corridor Series, examines where capital sits, what it costs at each tier and how it moves across the corridor. No single corridor transaction is resolved here. That question remains open across every study that follows. The public infrastructure required by private operators, including the digital trade backbone, land registries and wholesale markets, returns in **Concrete & Capital** later in the Corridor Series.

Most of these signals depend on capital structures that investors can assess and trust.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Four conditions would require this analysis to be revised.

The conclusions remain conditional on the evidence available when this report was prepared. Each condition below identifies the observable signal that would show the risk materialising.

PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE RISK

Public infrastructure declines faster than private capital can compensate

The report identifies midchain systems as the investable layer. Those systems depend on public goods: roads, wholesale markets, phytosanitary inspection regimes, land registries and energy infrastructure. When governments do not build or maintain that base, private midchain businesses have less to work with. Returns then compress in the markets where the opportunity appears largest. Across documented cases that include explicit constraint analysis, limited public implementation capacity appears more often as the binding factor than scarce private capital.

Signal. *The signal would be multi-season evidence that midchain operators in a target market are absorbing logistics, inspection or cold-chain costs that would normally be public provision. Another would be a sustained withdrawal of government infrastructure investment in a market identified as a near-term corridor opportunity.*

TENURE RISK

Land tenure insecurity makes the collateral premise unenforceable at the target tier

Several financing pathways discussed here depend on collateral supported by registered title or functioning warehouse-receipt regimes. Asset-backed credit is one such pathway. When collateral relies on land, the tenure must be registered and enforceable. It cannot be assumed from local context or precedent in another jurisdiction. Across much of sub-Saharan Africa, formal land registration is reported to cover only a fraction of agricultural holdings. Enforcement of secured interests is also reported to be inconsistent. **When collateral cannot be recovered, the lending carries materially more risk than an asset-backed description suggests.** The expected private return is correspondingly lower than the instrument's description implies.

Signal. *The signal would be an enforcement failure on a warehouse receipt or aggregator-held security in a target market. Another would be a legislative reversal or administrative delay to a land-registration programme on which a proposed lending structure depends.*

CORRIDOR RISK

The corridor between Australia and Africa may remain an analogy throughout the planning horizon

The institutional and services corridor examined here depends on complementary capabilities. Australia's R&D-led agricultural model maps onto the layer that the African agribusiness literature identifies as most underfunded. The evidence reviewed contains no closed or near-closed transaction that has passed the rules used to assess the corridor test set out in this section. It also contains no peer-reviewed Australia- Africa agribusiness comparison from which returns could be calibrated. If named counterparties with budgets do not emerge within a

reasonable planning horizon, the corridor loses its investable status. It remains a medium-term framing that requires primary evidence.

Signal. *The signal would be a further planning cycle without a transaction that passes the corridor test on p. 42. Another would be consistent operator interest on the African side that does not convert because the delivery path or budget does not yet exist.*

CAPITAL-TIER RISK

Capital instruments default to the corporate tier and the SME midchain remains structurally under-financed

This reading depends on capital reaching the SME and aggregator tier, where the bulk of hidden-middle food handling and employment sits. That tier is structurally less attractive to private capital than the corporate tier. It requires blended catalysts and partial guarantees to clear the risk-adjusted return hurdle. **If increased sector attention draws capital only at corporate-tier pricing, the SME and aggregator tier may remain under-financed.** The same outcome may follow if blended catalysts are withdrawn before commercial instruments replace them. Aggregate sector capital flows could then rise without reaching the layer that generates the most midchain employment value.

Signal. *The signal would be the exit of first-wave agri-SME lenders from a market citing structural under-returns, without replacement entrants pricing the same tier through a different instrument. Another would be growth in corporate-tier transactions without a corresponding increase in aggregator and SME lending.*

OPERATOR-ECONOMICS REVIEW

Every operator metric has an identified source, a verification tier and an exclusion rule.

The review uses anonymised operator archetypes to protect confidential diligence and avoid presenting illustrations as recommendations. It retains each source basis, verification tier and exclusion rule.

REVIEWED UNIVERSE 12 Twelve operators were reviewed. Eleven appear in the evidence matrix because at least one cited metric could be verified against a source. One was excluded because it was subject to active legal proceedings.		INCLUDED SOURCE TYPES The review includes audited annual accounts and securities filings, exchange or issuer documents, development-finance institution disclosures, company announcements and press reporting. Metrics without supporting evidence were omitted rather than estimated.	
NAMING CONVENTION Operators are identified by function, geography and filing basis rather than brand. Public company accounts remain traceable through the source types. The body uses archetypes because this analysis concerns operator economics rather than stock or company recommendations.		REVIEW BOUNDARY The matrix reflects evidence available for this publication cycle. It is not a complete census of African agribusiness operators, and no company year is treated as a sector average.	
Audited	Independently audited accounts filed through a securities exchange, regulator or equivalent public reporting channel. These accounts support margin, revenue, profit and repayment figures only where the filing contains the metric.	INDEPENDENTLY AUDITED SOURCE MATERIAL	
Disclosed	Exchange filings, issuer documents or development-finance institution programme disclosures. A specific metric is disclosed but not independently audited as part of the operator's full income statement.	USE WITH SCOPE LIMITS STATED	
Reported	Press coverage, company announcements, investor disclosures and other secondary reporting. These sources support cautionary or directional readings only. They do not support profitability claims.	CAUTIONARY OR DIRECTIONAL USE	
Identify operator function Processor, refiner, warehouse-receipt operator, input-credit aggregator, distributor or asset-light platform.	Tie every metric to a source Revenue, margin, repayment, capital raised and distress signals retain their source type and date.	Assign verification tier Audited, disclosed or reported. Figures do not move up a tier because they are repeated elsewhere.	Use archetypes in the review This review asks whether control and records make an operator bankable. It does not assess the attractiveness of any single company.

Exclusion rule: an operator is excluded from the matrix and body text if active fraud, insolvency or legal proceedings would overwhelm the operating economics point. The operator is not retained as a cautionary anecdote. The reviewed universe is therefore larger than the included matrix.

OPERATOR EVIDENCE

Audited public accounts support margin, revenue and repayment claims.

This page presents the operator figures supported by audited accounts. Unless stated otherwise, each row covers one operator and one reporting period.

Control and disclosure determine whether a row can support a margin or repayment claim. Sector and geography do not change that evidentiary limit.

Coverage of this tier: two Nigeria operators, two South Africa operators (one spanning Eswatini and Mozambique), one Sub-Saharan Africa and global operator, and one East and Southern Africa non-profit operator; FY2023–FY2024 reporting periods.

Listed integrated processor Nigeria; food processing	Operating margin 30.9%; EBITDA 31.6%; revenue NGN 1,527bn; PAT about NGN 266bn. One company, FY2024; not a sector average.	AUDITED Annual report; NGX filing FY2024
Single-commodity sugar refiner Nigeria; sugar refining	Gross margin fell from about 28.7% in H1 2023 to about 6.1% in H1 2024 as naira devaluation raised the cost of imported raw sugar. H1 2024 revenue was about NGN 295.6bn.	AUDITED Results presentation; NGX filing H1 2024
Multi-market commodity operator Sub-Saharan Africa and global	Segment revenue was \$533.2bn . Segment EBIT was \$51.02bn, equivalent to roughly a 3% margin , with the largest single share, 37 per cent, from processing and value-added activity. Africa-specific metrics are not separately reported.	AUDITED Annual report; group filing FY2024
Vertically integrated poultry processor South Africa; poultry and feed	Operating profit was R1.13bn in FY2024 , compared with an operating loss of about R621m in FY2023 . The filing ties the swing to avian influenza and power disruption across the physical system.	AUDITED Annual report; JSE filing FY2024/FY2023
Diversified sugar-and-staples processor South Africa; Eswatini; Mozambique	Revenue was R26.0bn , and the EBITDA margin was 8.8% , up from 6.9% in FY2023. The segment split was sugar R11.8bn, baking R9.1bn and groceries R5.3bn.	AUDITED Annual report; JSE filing FY2024
Multi-country non-profit input-credit operator East and Southern Africa	Farmer repayment was 96% , reported as an operating indicator outside the audited financial statements. Support and sales totalled US\$261m across about 2.1m farmers, and the net surplus was US\$19.6m. The non-profit structure is not directly comparable to for-profit cost of capital.	AUDITED + OPERATING Annual accounts; performance reporting FY2024

Use in the body: audited rows can support margin, revenue and repayment claims. The text nevertheless retains the relevant limit: one company, one period, or a non-profit structure. The next page presents disclosed and reported rows, which support narrower claims.

OPERATOR EVIDENCE

Disclosed and reported sources support narrower claims than audited accounts.

The rows below provide disclosed transaction and repayment data, together with reported cautionary evidence. They support only the transaction, repayment and cautionary claims stated.

Reach, funding and matching indicate activity. Durable economics require separate evidence.

Coverage of this page: the disclosed tier covers two Nigeria operators. The reported tier covers three distribution, freight-brokerage and freight-matching operators across East and West Africa.

DISCLOSED TIER – EXCHANGE-DISCLOSED OR DEVELOPMENT-FINANCE-VALIDATED		
Commodity-exchange and warehouse-receipt operator Nigeria; regional structured trade finance	Nigeria's first commodity-backed commercial paper on a commodities exchange raised NGN 26.9bn as at Q1 2022 and NGN 51bn across its first two series by 2023 . Reported turnover of NGN 63.72bn covers Q3 2024 to Q1 2025, and reported volume reached about 526,850 tonnes across three countries by May 2023. Revenue was not disclosed.	DISCLOSED Issuer notices; regulator presentation 2022-2025
Aggregator-led smallholder franchise Northern Nigeria; input credit and aggregation	A DFI disclosure reported repayment of about 99% . About 42,500 active farmers were reported in a FY2024 BII disclosure. Sources conflict on the income multiplier, so no single figure is stated.	DISCLOSED DFI disclosures: IFAD, FMO, BII 2024
REPORTED TIER – CAUTIONARY ARCHETYPES, NO AUDITED PROFITABILITY DISCLOSED		
B2B distribution platform East Africa; food and household distribution	Capital raised exceeded US\$180m across disclosed rounds. Restructuring was reported in 2023-2025, and main-city operations were suspended in mid-2025. Audited profitability has never been disclosed.	REPORTED Press reports; company filings 2023-2025
Asset-light road-freight brokerage East and West Africa; digital freight brokerage	Reported valuation fell from about US\$120m to about US\$5m. This signals distress but does not show operating performance. No audited profitability has been disclosed.	REPORTED Press reports; company filings 2024-2025
Digital freight marketplace West and East Africa; freight matching	Capital raised was about US\$79m on corrected reporting. Some institutional investors wrote down or exited their exposure, and the founder returned to the company. No audited profitability has been disclosed.	REPORTED Press reports; company filings 2019-2025

How reported rows are used: a reported distress or restructuring event supports a claim about the specific archetype named. It is not extrapolated into a sector-wide failure rate.

Blank cells rule: if revenue, margin, repayment or source support is missing, the metric is omitted rather than estimated. This is the main reason the matrix is smaller than the reviewed universe.

COMPACT GLOSSARY

These terms carry specific meanings in this analysis.

Each definition explains how the term is used here and why it matters to a transaction or advisory mandate.

Hidden middle

The hidden middle includes the traders, processors, storage, logistics, finance, quality and compliance functions between the farm and the final buyer.

Why it matters: much of the value and working-capital risk sits in these functions.

Warehouse receipt

A document or electronic record confirms that an approved warehouse holds a defined quantity and grade of commodity.

Why it matters: the record can turn verified inventory into collateral.

First-loss

A capital layer that absorbs initial losses before senior lenders or investors incur them.

Why it matters: this layer can make a difficult agri-SME exposure financeable while the underlying risk remains.

Partial credit guarantee

A guarantee covers part of a lender's loss if the borrower defaults, usually subject to limits and eligibility rules.

Why it matters: the guarantee can re-price a loan while leaving the lender exposed to performance.

Advance rate

The advance rate is the percentage of collateral value a lender is willing to finance. A lower rate leaves more protection against price or quality shocks.

Why it matters: the rate determines how much a lender will advance against inventory.

Basis risk

The risk that a hedge or reference price moves differently from the local physical price the operator receives or pays.

Why it matters: it can leave a commodity operator exposed even when a hedge exists.

ITMO

Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome: an emissions-reduction unit transferred between countries under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

Why it matters: an ITMO is relevant to sovereign carbon cooperation, although it does not provide a near-term standalone agribusiness case here.

EUDR

The EU Deforestation Regulation requires due diligence for specified commodities entering or leaving the EU market.

Why it matters: the regulation creates a current compliance need for cocoa, coffee and other origins.

MRV

Measurement, reporting and verification includes the systems used to document whether an environmental, compliance or carbon claim is supported.

Why it matters: a premium, credit or carbon claim is difficult to underwrite without MRV.

Off-take agreement

A contract in which a buyer commits in advance to purchase a defined volume of product, often on agreed price or quality terms.

Why it matters: a credible off-take can support financing against future output as well as stored output.

Blended finance

The combination of concessional or donor capital with commercial capital, structured so private investors can clear their return hurdle.

Why it matters: it is the mechanism behind most of the leverage ratios cited in this study.

De-risking

Contractual or structural measures, such as a guarantee, first-loss layer or verified off-take, that reduce the effective risk carried by a lender or investor.

Why it matters: these measures are usually cheaper than raising the price of capital to compensate for the same risk.

These glossary terms are working definitions rather than legal definitions. They support review of the evidence, a first diligence call and the separation of bankable records from narrative claims.

NOTES AND SOURCE CONVENTION

This analysis rejects four claims and applies one source convention.

The analysis rejects four inferences, regardless of how persuasive the underlying number appears. Every retained figure carries its source, date and scope on the page where it is used.

WHAT THIS ANALYSIS WILL NOT CLAIM

✗ **Funding raised does not establish performance.**
Capital records a successful raise at one point. It does not show whether the business will last.

✗ **One good season does not show a track record.**
Repayment, yield and margin must hold through a difficult season before they establish one.

✗ **Reach does not establish usage.**
Registered users, downloads and partnerships measure visibility. Active paying use is the test.

✗ **Diaspora scale is not a sector measure.**
The diaspora is a bridge to access and trust; it is not used as a proxy for market size.

Reference convention. Exhibit captions follow this sequence: **Source note:** source; year; geography or scope; metric or use; verification/status. The list below follows: **Author/Institution. Title. Year. Publisher/site. Used for:** the claim or figure supported. Each figure retains its source date and claim limits on the page where it appears. The endnote is a second reference point.

HOW THE CONVENTION READS IN PRACTICE

DIRECTIONAL ESTIMATE

An exhibit elsewhere in this study states: “**Published estimates place 40 to 70 per cent of urban African food costs in post-farm-gate activities, while agro-industrial activity received 4 per cent of agricultural development finance flows to West Africa from 2010 to 2020.**” The source note remains with the sentence and also appears in the endnotes.

Source note: AGRA, Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2017; African Union Commission and OECD, Africa’s Development Dynamics, 2023; directional.

PROGRAMME-REPORTED, INDEPENDENTLY CITED

A capital-stack exhibit states that the blended-finance facility reaches **roughly ten times** its concessional layer in lending capacity. The status label identifies the facility operator’s own reporting and the independent citation.

Source note: Aceli Africa/Dalberg, 2024; East and Southern Africa; programme-reported by Aceli, independently cited in an OECD DAC blended-finance case study; facility-specific.

Full source list: the bibliography follows on page 54 and uses the same reference convention. Larger type and claim-use notes remain visible beside each source.

The next study in the Corridor Series, The Movement of Money, examines how capital is priced, moved and secured across the same corridor.

SOURCE LIST

Each source remains attached to the claim it supports.

Each entry gives the institution or author, title, year or series, publisher or site, and the specific claim or figure supported.

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